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  1. How Virtuous Actions are a Means to Contemplation.Sukaina Hirji - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.
    In a number of passages in the Nicomachean Ethics [NE], Aristotle seems to suggest that ethically virtuous actions are an instrumental means to contemplation. But, as many scholars have worried, this view appears to be both implausible on its face, and in tension with other commitments Aristotle has. The difficulty in understanding the relationship between virtuous actions and contemplation is part of a larger puzzle about the structure of value in Aristotle’s ethical theory. Does Aristotle countenance a plurality of independently (...)
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  2. Virtue and Contemplation in Eudemian Ethics 8.3.Roy C. Lee - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.
    This paper argues that in Eudemian Ethics 8.3, virtue’s mean between excess and deficiency is defined by the standard of promoting the most contemplation. Promotion is indirect and constrained by virtue’s other essential features. The chapter’s apparent restriction of the standard to actions concerning natural goods actually serves a dialectical, not a restrictive, purpose. This paper proposes to unify the chapter’s argumentative arc.
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  3. Aristotle's Virtue Ethics.John Bowin - 2020 - In Bowin John (ed.), A Companion to World Literature. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Aristotle, though not the first Greek virtue ethicist, was the first to establish virtue ethics as a distinct philosophical discipline. His exposition of the subject in his Nicomachean Ethics set the terms of subsequent debate in the European and Arabic traditions by proposing a set of plausible assumptions from which virtue ethics should proceed. His conception of human well-being and virtue as well as his brand of ethical naturalism were influential from antiquity through the Middle Ages and continue to be (...)
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  4. Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (1):1-28.
    Aristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn't generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite (...)
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  5. Aristotle on Enduring Evils While Staying Happy.Marta Jimenez - 2018 - In Pavlos Kontos (ed.), Evil in Aristotle. Cambridge University Press. pp. 150-169.
    In what ways and how far does virtue shield someone against suffering evils? In other words, how do non-moral evils affect the lives of virtuous people and to what extent can someone endure evils while staying happy? The central purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions by exploring what Aristotle has to say about the effects of evils in human well-being in general and his treatment of extreme misfortunes.
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  6. Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness.Eric Brown - 2006 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 22 (1):221-256.
    Aristotle's account of external goods in Nicomachean Ethics I 8-12 is often thought to amend his narrow claim that happiness is virtuous activity. I argue, to the contrary, that on Aristotle's account, external goods are necessary for happiness only because they are necessary for virtuous activity. My case innovates in three main respects: I offer a new map of EN I 8-12; I identify two mechanisms to explain why virtuous activity requires external goods, including a psychological need for external goods; (...)
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