Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388 (2012)
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I argue that most of the alleged straight solutions to Kripke's Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. I then argue that the dilemma is a by-product of an unnecessary foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification and is therefore spurious. Finally, I outline an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behavior which vindicates some of the insights behind Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution of the paradox.
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First archival date: 2012-11-10
Latest version: 4 (2017-06-24)
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Themes From Kaplan.Almog, Joseph; Perry, John & Wettstein, Howard (eds.)
Naming and Necessity.Kripke, Saul A.
Mind and World.McDowell, John

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