Contents
31 found
Order:
  1. Gesticulation as the integration of body and mind-a semantics of nodding.Daihyun Chung - manuscript
    Human mind and human body have been separated from each other as belonging to familiar different categories. But what if we are supposed to admit a category of bodily posture? This is a paper to advance a thesis that mental content in bodily posture is a basis to integrate mind and body. First, what is the basis to claim that there is such a thing as a bodily posture? We humans all communicate each other not only through an ordinary language (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt.Chad Gonnerman & John P. Waterman - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
    Pinillos’ Why We Doubt presents a powerful critique of such global skeptical assertions as “I don’t know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” by introducing a cognitive mechanism that is sensitive to error possibilities and a Bayesian rule of rationality that this mechanism is designed to approximate. This multifaceted argument offers a novel counter to global skepticism, contending that our basis for believing such premises is underminable. In this work, we engage with Pinillos’ adoption of Bayesianism, questioning whether the Bayesian (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - forthcoming - In Rik Peels & René Van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.
    What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. In this paper, I compare Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions, and show that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. I then examine Austin and Wittgenstein’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Knowledge, Confidence, and Epistemic Injustice.Robert Vinten - 2024 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 11 (1):99-119.
    In this paper I begin by explaining what epistemic injustice is and what ordinary language philosophy is. I then go on to ask why we might doubt the usefulness of ordinary language philosophy in examining epistemic injustice. In the first place, we might wonder how ordinary language philosophy can be of use, given that many of the key terms used in discussing epistemic injustice, including ‘epistemic injustice’ itself, are not drawn from our ordinary language. We might also have doubts about (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. A Quantitative History of Ordinary Language Philosophy.J. D. Porter & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1–36.
    There is a standard story told about the rise and fall of ordinary language philosophy: it was a widespread, if not dominant, approach to philosophy in Great Britain in the aftermath of World War II up until the early 1960s, but with the development of systematic approaches to the study of language—formal semantic theories on one hand and Gricean pragmatics on the other—ordinary language philosophy more or less disappeared. In this paper we present quantitative evidence to evaluate the standard story (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1023-1031.
    This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that _cannot_ be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Common Sense and Ordinary Language: Wittgenstein and Austin.Krista Lawlor - 2020 - In Rik Peels & René van Woudenberg (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
    What role does ‘ordinary language philosophy’ play in the defense of common sense beliefs? J.L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein each give central place to ordinary language in their responses to skeptical challenges to common sense beliefs. But Austin and Wittgenstein do not always respond to such challenges in the same way, and their working methods are different. In this paper, I compare Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical positions, and show that they share many metaphilosophical commitments. I then examine Austin and Wittgenstein’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.
    I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Paradigm Case Arguments.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:NA.
    From time to time philosophers and scientists have made sensational, provocative claims that certain things do not exist or never happen that, in everyday life, we unquestioningly take for granted as existing or happening. These claims have included denying the existence of matter, space, time, the self, free will, and other sturdy and basic elements of our common-sense or naïve world-view. Around the middle of the twentieth century an argument was developed that can be used to challenge many such skeptical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. What do Philosophers do? Scepticism and the Practice of Philosophy, by Penelope Maddy. [REVIEW]Brian Weatherson - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):269-271.
    Review of _ What do Philosophers do? Scepticism and the Practice of Philosophy _, by Penelope Maddy.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. “Nobody would really talk that way!”: the critical project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy.Nat Hansen - 2018 - Synthese 197 (6):2433-2464.
    This paper defends a challenge, inspired by arguments drawn from contemporary ordinary language philosophy and grounded in experimental data, to certain forms of standard philosophical practice. The challenge is inspired by contemporary philosophers who describe themselves as practicing “ordinary language philosophy”. Contemporary ordinary language philosophy can be divided into constructive and critical approaches. The critical approach to contemporary ordinary language philosophy has been forcefully developed by Avner Baz, who attempts to show that a substantial chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  12. Review of Avner Baz, The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nat Hansen - 2018 - Mind 128 (511):963-970.
    This is the second book by Baz that aims to show that a big chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. His first book, When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (2012) adopted a therapeutic approach (in the Wittgensteinian style) to problems in contemporary epistemology, arguing that when properly thought through, the way philosophers talk about ‘knowing’ that something is the case ultimately does not make sense. Baz’s goal in his second book is less therapeutic and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Stroud, Austin, and Radical Skepticism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2016 - Sképsis 14:57-75.
    Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. On “biscopic” approach to the sceptical paradox. [].Francois-Igor Pris - 2015 - Философия И Социальные Науки (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 2:32-37.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. On Kripke's skeptical paradox and Wittgenstein's rule-following problem.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 1:65-112.
    Предлагается виттгенштайновское решение скептического парадокса Крипке, который возникает в результате пренебрежения прагматикой и нормативным измерением производимых операций. Парадокс Крипке указывает на то, что натурализация смысла и проблемы следования правилу в рамках классического (ненормативного) натурализма невозможна. Анализируется и критикуется недавно предложенная Гинзборг интерпретация парадокса. Хотя её натуралистический «срединный путь» между диспозиционализмом и ментализмом и близок к нормативному виттгенштайновскому натурализму, вводимое ею понятие примитивной нормативности неудовлетворительно. Правильнее говорить не о натурализме с минимальным добавлением нормативности, как это делает Гинзборг, а о нормативном натурализме.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Linguistic intuitions in context: a defense of nonskeptical pure invariantism.John Turri - 2014 - In Anthony Robert Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 165-184.
    Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is that it poorly accommodates linguistic intuitions about certain cases. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  17. La teoria della memoria di Reid in contesto.Andrea Guardo - 2013 - In Thomas Reid & Andrea Guardo (eds.), Saggio sulla memoria. Mimesis. pp. 15-36.
    Un'introduzione ad alcune delle idee principali della filosofia di Thomas Reid, scritta per la traduzione italiana del saggio sulla memoria, dai "Saggi sui poteri intellettuali dell'uomo".
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Kripke's account of the rule‐following considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by‐product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  20. Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the rule following paradox.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous? rule - following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule? the applications of which are potentially infinite? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule - following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Su che cosa si pretende dal significato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Acme 62 (1):335-347.
    Una difesa di una soluzione antirealista al paradosso del seguire una regola.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Il mito del dato.Andrea Guardo - 2008 - Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Milano
    "Mente e mondo", il libro che raccoglie le tanto celebrate quanto discusse "John Locke Lectures" di John McDowell, appartiene ad un genere filosofico classico, quello dell'"indagine sui poteri della mente umana". Secondo McDowell, un'indagine di questo tipo è necessaria alla risoluzione di alcuni fra i principali problemi epistemologici e semantici. Attraverso una dettagliata analisi dei lavori di McDowell ed un'approfondita discussione del problema del "seguire una regola" e del connesso paradosso di Kripke-Wittgenstein, questo volume cerca di dimostrare che la posizione (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Truth, correspondence, models, and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Sami Pihlström, Panu Raatikainen & Matti Sintonen (eds.), Approaching truth: essays in honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Publications. pp. 99-112.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  24. Kripke's Second Paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201.Samuel Weir - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178.
    The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument from Pretence.Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) - 2004 - Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. The Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2003 - Dissertation, King's College London
    The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. This is Simply What I Do.Catherine Legg - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):58–80.
    Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following is widely regarded to have identified what Kripke called "the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date". But does it? This paper examines the problem in the light of Charles Peirce's distinctive "scientific hierarchy". Peirce identifies a phenomenological inquiry which is prior to both logic and metaphysics, whose role is to identify the most fundamental philosophical categories. His third category, particularly salient in this context, pertains to general predication. Rule-following scepticism, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  29. The self-defeating character of skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  30. Skepticism and interpretation.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):317-339.
    Donald Davidson has argued that attention to the necessarily public character of language shows that we cannot be massively mistaken about the world around us, and that consequently skeptical doubts about empirical knowledge are misplaced. The arguments Davidson advances rely on taking as the fundamental methodological standpoint for investigating meaning and related concepts the standpoint of the interpreter of another speaker, on the grounds that it is from the interpreter’s standpoint that we discover what constraints are placed on meaning by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  31. Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscript
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation