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  1. added 2018-10-05
    Review of Avner Baz, The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nat Hansen - forthcoming - Mind:fzy064.
    This is the second book by Baz that aims to show that a big chunk of contemporary philosophy is fundamentally misguided. His first book, When Words Are Called For: A Defense of Ordinary Language Philosophy (2012) adopted a therapeutic approach (in the Wittgensteinian style) to problems in contemporary epistemology, arguing that when properly thought through, the way philosophers talk about ‘knowing’ that something is the case ultimately does not make sense. Baz’s goal in his second book is less therapeutic and (...)
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  2. added 2018-09-06
    What Do Philosophers Do? Scepticism and the Practice of Philosophy, by Penelope Maddy. [REVIEW]Brian Weatherson - forthcoming - Mind:fzy024.
    Review of _ What do Philosophers do? Scepticism and the Practice of Philosophy _, by Penelope Maddy.
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  3. added 2018-06-25
    Gesticulation as the Integration of Body and Mind-a Semantics of Nodding.Daihyun Chung - manuscript
    Human mind and human body have been separated from each other as belonging to familiar different categories. But what if we are supposed to admit a category of bodily posture? This is a paper to advance a thesis that mental content in bodily posture is a basis to integrate mind and body. First, what is the basis to claim that there is such a thing as a bodily posture? We humans all communicate each other not only through an ordinary language (...)
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  4. added 2017-05-03
    Skepticism and Interpretation.Kirk Ludwig - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):317-339.
    Donald Davidson has argued that attention to the necessarily public character of language shows that we cannot be massively mistaken about the world around us, and that consequently skeptical doubts about empirical knowledge are misplaced. The arguments Davidson advances rely on taking as the fundamental methodological standpoint for investigating meaning and related concepts the standpoint of the interpreter of another speaker, on the grounds that it is from the interpreter’s standpoint that we discover what constraints are placed on meaning by (...)
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  5. added 2017-03-05
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism.Douglas C. Long - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):67-84.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world." (...)
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  6. added 2017-02-10
    Stroud, Austin, and Radical Skepticism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Flavio Williges - 2016 - Sképsis 14:57-75.
    Is ruling out the possibility that one is dreaming a requirement for a knowledge claim? In “Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life” (1984), Barry Stroud defends that it is. In “Others Minds” (1970), John Austin says it is not. In his defense, Stroud appeals to a conception of objectivity deeply rooted in us and with which our concept of knowledge is intertwined. Austin appeals to a detailed account of our scientific and everyday practices of knowledge attribution. Stroud responds that what Austin (...)
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  7. added 2017-02-01
    Kripke's Second Paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201.Samuel Weir - 2007 - Philosophical Investigations 30 (2):172–178.
    The received view of Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it fails as an interpretation because, inter alia, it ignores or overlooks what Wittgenstein has to say in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations 201. In this paper, I demonstrate that the paragraph in question is in fact fully accommodated within Kripke's reading, and cannot therefore be reasonably utilised to object to it. -/- In part one I characterise the objection; in part two I explain why it (...)
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  8. added 2016-12-08
    Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
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  9. added 2016-11-08
    Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscript
    G.E. Moore’s writings on external world skepticism show us, in broad outline, how to dispense with external world skepticism in a way that is satisfying, intellectually responsible, and yet avoids engaging in constructive epistemological theory-building altogether. His work thus reveals something very important about the relation between epistemology and ordinary life, and also about what it would take to reach a satisfying resolution of certain sorts of perennial philosophical problems.
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  10. added 2016-09-02
    Skepticism and Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 131--144.
    According to some powerful skeptical arguments, we know almost nothing. Contextualist theories of knowledge ascriptions have been developed with an eye toward resisting skepticism. Have the contextualists succeeded? After briefly outlining their view, I will consider whether contextualism about knowledge ascriptions provides a satisfactory response to one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism. I conclude with some questions for the contextualist. As we’ll see, the effectiveness of the contextualist solution to skepticism is far from settled.
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  11. added 2015-09-05
    La teoria della memoria di Reid in contesto.Andrea Guardo - 2013 - In Saggio sulla memoria. Milano-Udine: Mimesis. pp. 15-36.
    An introduction to Thomas Reid’s epistemology and philosophy of mind, written for the Italian translation of his essay on memory.
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  12. added 2015-09-05
    Il Mito del Dato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Milano-Udine: Mimesis.
    A critique of John McDowell’s theory of content, with special emphasis on his reading of Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations.
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  13. added 2015-09-05
    Su che cosa si pretende dal significato.Andrea Guardo - 2009 - Annali Della Facoltà di Lettere E Filosofia 62 (1):335-347.
    A defence of a relativist view of rule-following. The paper is a précis of “Il Mito del Dato”.
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  14. added 2015-09-05
    Come faccio a sapere che questo colore è rosso?Andrea Guardo - 2007 - In Simona Chiodo & Paolo Valore (eds.), Questioni di metafisica contemporanea. Milano: Il Castoro. pp. 181-193.
    A commentary on § 381 of part I of the “Philosophical Investigations”, published in the proceedings of the conference Esperienza e Giudizio.
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  15. added 2014-03-25
    On Kripke's Skeptical Paradox and Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Problem.Francois-Igor Pris - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations (Russian E-Journal) 1:65-112.
    Предлагается виттгенштайновское решение скептического парадокса Крипке, который возникает в результате пренебрежения прагматикой и нормативным измерением производимых операций. Парадокс Крипке указывает на то, что натурализация смысла и проблемы следования правилу в рамках классического (ненормативного) натурализма невозможна. Анализируется и критикуется недавно предложенная Гинзборг интерпретация парадокса. Хотя её натуралистический «срединный путь» между диспозиционализмом и ментализмом и близок к нормативному виттгенштайновскому натурализму, вводимое ею понятие примитивной нормативности неудовлетворительно. Правильнее говорить не о натурализме с минимальным добавлением нормативности, как это делает Гинзборг, а о нормативном натурализме.
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  16. added 2012-12-28
    Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence.Edoardo Zamuner (ed.) - 2004 - Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
    This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea (...)
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  17. added 2012-12-23
    Truth, Correspondence, Models, and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Press. pp. 99-112.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...)
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  18. added 2012-12-20
    Kripke's Account of the Rule‐Following Considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    I argue that most of the alleged straight solutions to Kripke's Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. I then argue that the dilemma is a by-product of an unnecessary foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification and is therefore spurious. Finally, I outline an alternative conception of the justification of linguistic behavior which vindicates some of the insights behind Kripkenstein’s skeptical solution of the paradox.
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  19. added 2012-12-19
    Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the Rule Following Paradox.Adam M. Croom - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In?201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous? rule - following paradox.? The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule? the applications of which are potentially infinite? when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule - following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke concedes the skeptical (...)
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  20. added 2012-10-03
    “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2004 - In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
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