Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to the Paper of Sven Bernecker

In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 181-188 (2015)
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In his “On the Metaphysics of Knowledge” (this volume), Sven Bernecker presents a novel ‘identificationist’ account of knowledge. In this paper, I will not directly address the epistemological adequacy of Bernecker’s identificationism. Rather, I want to focus on its substantial metaphysical commitments, especially on the problematic idea that our epistemic reasons identify the truthmaker of our respective belief when we know something. My conclusion will be that being a truthmaker for p is metaphysically more demanding than being an epistemic reason for p. A truthmaker for p must necessitate the truth of p, while an epistemic reason for p must merely indicate the truth of p. Thus, we should not expect that epistemic reasons identify the truthmakers of our knowledge-constituting beliefs in the way Bernecker suggests.
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