Credible Futures

Synthese (3-4):10953-10968 (2021)
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Abstract
This paper articulates in formal terms a crucial distinction concerning future contingents, the distinction between what is true about the future and what is reasonable to believe about the future. Its key idea is that the branching structures that have been used so far to model truth can be employed to define an epistemic property, credibility, which we take to be closely related to knowledge and assertibility, and which is ultimately reducible to probability. As a result, two kinds of claims about future contingents—one concerning truth, the other concerning credibility—can be smoothly handled within a single semantic framework.
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2021
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IACCF-3
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Archival date: 2021-06-14
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2021-06-14

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