Naturalismus und Intentionalität

In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp. pp. 187-204 (2000)
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Naturalism in theoretical philosophy comes in three kinds: metaphysical, scientific and semantical. Metaphysical naturalism holds that only natural things exist, scientific (or methodological) naturalism holds that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth, semantic (or analytic) naturalism tries to provide sufficient nonintentional conditions for intentional phenomena. The paper argues that analytic naturalism does not render metaphysical or scientific naturalism obsolete, but can be understood as a further step in elaborating upon these programmes. The intentional idiom of belief-desire psychology is the main obstacle for a scientific view of the world. It is hard to see how human beings and their abilities could get integrated into the natural order if intentional phenomena defy analysis in naturalistically acceptable terms. Against this view, Stephen Stich has argued that the search for a naturalistic criterion of acceptable predicates is misguided, since there is no way of identifying naturalistically acceptable predicates in advance. All that counts, Stich claims, is that the predicates in question are applied in “successful scientific theories”. A naturalist, however, must be able to indicate what he takes to be successful science and why. Perhaps analytic naturalism is without prospect of success. This would be bad news for the naturalist, which he cannot sidestep by claiming hat scientific naturalism must have had something different in mind.
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