Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of epistemic access to numbers. For an incompatibilist, proofs of numerical non-identities must appeal to primitive incompatibilities. I argue that no analytic primitive incompatibilities are forthcoming. Hence incompatibilists cannot be Fregeans.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
KRBIIC
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-02-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-02-22

Total views
162 ( #27,378 of 53,664 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #19,894 of 53,664 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.