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  1. added 2019-08-02
    Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
    Our moral experience of the world comes in many flavors. Is there any phenomenal unity definitive of moral experience? Several philosophers have contested this, notably Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that paying close phenomenological attention to our moral emotions, and to what separates them from other emotions, paves the way to a promising hypothesis about the unity of moral experience.
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  2. added 2019-07-03
    A Note on the Definition of Gratitude.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    In this paper, I object to Michael Rush’s definitions of targeted and propositional gratitude.
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  3. added 2019-06-04
    The Virtue of Gratitude and Its Associated Vices.Tony Manela - forthcoming - The Moral Psychology of Gratitude.
    Gratitude, the proper or fitting response to benevolence, has often been conceptualized as a virtue—a temporally stable disposition to perceive, think, feel, and act in certain characteristic ways in certain situations. Many accounts of gratitude as a virtue, however, have not analyzed this disposition accurately, and as a result, they have not revealed the rich variety of ways in which someone can fail to be a grateful person. In this paper, I articulate an account of the virtue of gratitude, and (...)
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  4. added 2015-04-23
    Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.
    Philosophers generally agree that gratitude, the called-for response to benevolence, includes positive feelings. In this paper, I argue against this view. The grateful beneficiary will have certain feelings, but in some contexts, those feelings will be profoundly negative. Philosophers overlook this fact because they tend to consider only cases of gratitude in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and in which the benefactor fares well after performing an act of benevolence. When we consider cases in which a benefactor suffers severely, (...)
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