The Concept of 'I' in Kant's First Critique

In Agemir Bavaresco, Evandro Pontel & Jair Tauchen (eds.), Setenário. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: Editora Fundação Fênix. pp. 41-56 (2023)
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I seek to show in this paper how, in addressing the concept of “I” and the question of self-knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason, one encounters a paradox, which is essentially a consequence of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I point to Kant's concept of “I” and its three co-constitutive perspectives. The importance of the concept of subject and its intertwining with the concept of reason is pointed out, as also how these two concepts appear in the text of the Critique of Pure Reason as presuppositions. Subsequently, I deal with some basic questions of transcendental idealism. Finally, I briefly present the three perspectives of the "I": as a phenomenon, as a transcendental structure, and as a noumenon. I conclude by bringing back what Kant himself conceives as a paradox, which is the subject’s self-affection, and the relation between the subject as noumenon and as inner sense.

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Adriano Kurle
Universidade Federal de Mato Grosso


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