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  1. What Does it Mean to ‘Act in the Light of’ a Norm? Heidegger and Kant on Commitments and Critique.Sacha Golob - forthcoming - In Matt Burch & Irene McMullin (eds.), Transcending Reason. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 79-98.
    This paper examines Heidegger’s position on a foundational distinction for Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy: that between acting ‘in the light of’ a norm and acting ‘merely in accordance with it’. In section 1, I introduce the distinction and highlight several relevant similarities between Kant and Heidegger on ontology and the first-person perspective. In section 2, I press the Kantian position further, focusing on the role of inferential commitments in perception: this provides a foil against which Heidegger’s account can be In (...)
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  2. The Analytic of Concepts.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - 2024 - In Mark Timmons & Sorin Baiasu (eds.), The Kantian Mind. London and New York: Routledge.
    The aim of the Analytic of Concepts is to derive and deduce a set of pure concepts of the understanding, the categories, which play a central role in Kant’s explanation of the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition and judgment. This chapter is structured around two questions. First, what is a pure concept of the understanding? Second, what is involved in a deduction of a pure concept of the understanding? In answering the first, we focus on how the categories differ (...)
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  3. Apperception and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Stéfano Straulino - 2024 - In Roberto Casales García (ed.), Practical and Theoretical Reason in Modern Philosophy. Delaware: Vernon Press. pp. 105-124.
    In several places of his work, Kant distinguishes between two senses of self-consciousness: a pure one and an empirical one. The aim of this work is to analyze these two senses of consciousness and show that, for Kant, self-consciousness does not occur unrestrictedly: a relation with something other than consciousness is needed for it to become conscious of itself. I carry out these objectives throughout six sections. In the first one I lay out the Kantian principle of pure apperception. In (...)
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  4. "Relative" Spontaneity and Reason's Self-Knowledge.Addison Ellis - 2023 - Studies in Transcendental Philosophy 3 (3).
    Kant holds that the whole “higher faculty of knowledge” (‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ in a broad sense), is a spontaneous faculty. But what could this mean? It seems that it could either be a perfectly innocent claim or a very dangerous one. The innocent thought is that reason is spontaneous because it is not wholly passive, not just a slave to what bombards the senses. If so, then the rejection of Hume’s radical empiricism would suffice for Kant’s claim. But the dangerous (...)
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  5. The Concept of 'I' in Kant's First Critique.Adriano Kurle - 2023 - In Agemir Bavaresco, Evandro Pontel & Jair Tauchen (eds.), Setenário. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: Editora Fundação Fênix. pp. 41-56.
    I seek to show in this paper how, in addressing the concept of “I” and the question of self-knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason, one encounters a paradox, which is essentially a consequence of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I point to Kant's concept of “I” and its three co-constitutive perspectives. The importance of the concept of subject and its intertwining with the concept of reason is pointed out, as also how these two concepts appear in the text of (...)
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  6. Sensibility, Understanding, and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: From Epistemic Compositionalism to Epistemic Hylomorphism.Maximilian Tegtmeyer - 2023 - Review of Metaphysics 77 (1):57-85.
    Can sensibility, as our capacity to be sensibly presented with objects, be understood independently of the understanding, as the capacity to form judgments about those objects? It is a truism that for judgments to be empirical knowledge they must agree with what sensibility presents. Moreover, it is a familiar thought that objectivity involves absolute independence from intellectual acts. The author argues that together these thoughts motivate a common reading of Kant on which operations of sensibility are conceived as intelligible independently (...)
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  7. Self-Consciousness and the Priority Question: A Critique of the 'Sensibility First' Reading of Kant.Addison Ellis - 2022 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 63:11-49.
    This essay presents a critique of what Robert Hanna has recently called the ‘sensibility first’ reading of Kant. I first spell out, in agreement with Hanna, why the contemporary debate among Kant scholars over conceptualism and non-conceptualism must be understood only from within the perspective of what I dub the ‘priority question’—that is, the question whether one or the other of our “two stems” of cognition may ground the objectivity and normativity of the other. I then spell out why the (...)
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  8. Kant’s Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions of the Categories. Tasks, Steps, and Claims of Identity.Till Hoeppner - 2022 - In Giuseppe Motta, Dennis Schulting & Udo Thiel (eds.), Kant's Transcendental Deduction and the Theory of Apperception: New Interpretations. Berlin: De Gruyter. pp. 461-492.
    Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories justifies their apriority, i.e. that their contents originate in the understanding itself, while the Transcendental Deduction justifies their objectivity, both in that they purport to represent objects of experience and that they do so successfully. The apriority of the categories, as explained in terms of acts of synthesis required for having sensible intuitions of objects, is justified by establishing their generic identity with logical functions of judgment, i.e. acts of judgment required for referring concepts (...)
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  9. Why the Objective World Depends on Thought. Dissolving Stroud’s Metaphysical Aporia Using Kant’s Notion of an Object.Till Hoeppner - 2022 - Synthesis – Journal for Philosophy 2:145-179.
    In his final monograph, Barry Stroud argues that certain fundamental concepts, like the concept of causation, are not only indispensable to any thought of an objective, independent world, but that they are also, therefore, invulnerable to skeptical attack. Given some assumptions about thought and objectivity, this leads him into the following metaphysical aporia: We can neither metaphysically establish that the objective, independent world is as we must think of it nor that it is not that way. I will argue that (...)
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  10. Apperception and Object. Comments on Mario Caimi's Reading of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2022 - Revista de Estudios Kantianos 7 (2):462-481.
    I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).
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  11. Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds.Jacob Browning - 2021 - Kantian Review 26 (2):185-208.
    Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with (...)
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  12. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress: The Court of Reason (Oslo, 6–9 August 2019). De Gruyter. pp. 641-650.
    talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  13. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 641-650.
    talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  14. Kant and Rödl on the Identity of Self-Consciousness and Objectivity.Addison Ellis - 2020 - Studi Kantiani:141-158.
    Sebastian Rödl’s 2018 book articulates and unfolds the thought that judgment’s self-consciousness is identical with its objectivity. This view is laid forth in a Hegelian spirit, against the spirit of Kant’s merely formal or transcendental idealism. I review Rödl’s central theses and then offer a criticism of his reading of Kant. I hold that we can agree with Rödl that self-consciousness is identical with objectivity (though only in a ‘formal’ sense). We can also agree with Rödl that this identity enables (...)
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  15. Kant on Self-Consciousness as Self-Limitation.Addison Ellis - 2020 - Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 5.
    I argue that, for Kant, there is a point at which the notions of self-consciousness and self-limitation become one. I proceed by spelling out a logical progression of forms of self-consciousness in Kant’s philosophy, where at each stage we locate the limits of the capacity in question and ask what it takes to know those limits. After briefly sketching a notion of self-consciousness available even to the animal, we look at whether there could be a notion of self-consciousness available to (...)
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  16. What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2020 - In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais (eds.), Kant and Animals. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of (...)
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  17. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  18. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  19. “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...)
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  20. The structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the genesis of Cartesian self.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 3:535-548.
    The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same (...)
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  21. Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of (...)
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  22. The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
    Critical notice of Béatrice Longuenesse's book *I, Me, Mine*.
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  23. Kant on Reflection and Virtue (by Melissa Merritt). [REVIEW]Francey Russell - 2019 - Society for German Idealism and Romanticism 2:60-72.
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  24. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  25. Kant on Reflection and Virtue.Melissa Merritt - 2018 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centred on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over her own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant’s conception of moral virtue as it is (...)
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  26. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
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  27. Kant, Metaphysical Space, and the Unity of the Subject.Jessica J. Williams - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel and Margit Ruffing (ed.), Proceedings of the 12. International Kant Congress Nature and Freedom. De Gruyter. pp. 1141-1147.
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  28. Signaling systems and the transcendental deduction.A. Ahmed - 2017 - In K. Pearce & T. Goldschmidt (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  29. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized through inner (...)
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  30. The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - 2017 - In Giuseppe Motta & Udo Thiel (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 32-46.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  31. The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.Addison Ellis - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos (6):138-164.
    Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for (...)
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  32. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: (1) in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; (2) in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational (...)
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  33. Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 hb £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):546-554.
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  34. Kant and thought insertion.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 3.
    This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations " (Kant, KrV, B132). (...)
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  35. Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.
    Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xv + 477.
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  36. Gap? What Gap?—On the Unity of Apperception and the Necessary Application of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Giuseppe Motta & Udo Thiel (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 89-113.
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  37. Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 257-293.
    In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction (...)
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  38. Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...)
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  39. Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel.Colin R. Marshall - 2016 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness. De Gruyter. pp. 281-285.
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  40. Review: Corey Dyck's 'Kant and Rational Psychology'. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2016 - Studi Kantiani 29:185-191.
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  41. Kant on the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. London, England: Palgrave.
    Recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. In this paper we show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian cognition and we suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of (...)
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  42. Forms of Judgment as a Link between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause.Srećko Kovač - 2014 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski & Marek Rosiak (eds.), Substantiality and Causality. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 51-66.
    The paper sets out from Göodel's question about primitive concepts, in connection with Gödel's proposal of the employment of phenomenological method. The author assumes that the answer that can be found in Kant is relevant as a starting point. In a modification of the approach by K. Reich, a reconstruction of Kant's "deduction'' of logical forms of judgment is presented, which serve Kant as the basis for his "metaphysical deduction of categories'' including substantiality and causality. It is proposed that different (...)
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  43. Consciousness and Personal Identity.Owen Ware & Donald C. Ainslie - 2014 - In Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 245-264.
    This paper offers an overview of consciousness and personal identity in eighteenth-century philosophy. Locke introduces the concept of persons as subjects of consciousness who also simultaneously recognize themselves as such subjects. Hume, however, argues that minds are nothing but bundles of perceptions, lacking intrinsic unity at a time or across time. Yet Hume thinks our emotional responses to one another mean that persons in everyday life are defined by their virtues, vices, bodily qualities, property, riches, and the like. Rousseau also (...)
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  44. A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - 2013 - Dissertation, Ufpr, Brazil
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  45. Sorin Baiasu, Kant and Sartre: Rediscovering Critical Ethics London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 Pp. 291, hbk, £55.00 ISBN: 9780230001503. [REVIEW]Chris Onof - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):323-328.
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  46. Apperzeption und idealrealistische Begründung.Patrick Grüneberg - 2011 - In Elena Ficara (ed.), Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann. pp. 221--230.
    Das Projekt einer Begründung der Philosophie, insbesondere der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, verbindet sich programmatisch mit dem kritischen Werk Kants und dort mit dem Konzept der transzendentalen Apperzeption. Dieser „höchste Punkt“ bildete seinerseits auch einen der zentralen Anknüpfungspunkte nachfolgender idealistischer Entwürfe und sich daraus entwickelnder Systeme. Die nachkantische Entwicklung wird dabei häufig mit dem Rubrum einer spekulativen Überhöhung des transzendentalen Kritizismus Kants belegt. Dabei ging es Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer – um nur die prominenten Vertreter zu nennen – in erster Linie (...)
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  47. Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):59-84.
    Abstract: My aim is to reconstruct Kant's argument for the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. I reconstruct Kant's argument in stages, first showing why thinking should be conceived as an activity of synthesis (as opposed to attention), and then showing why the unity or coherence of a subject's representations should depend upon an a priori synthesis. The guiding thread of my account is Kant's conception of enlightenment: as I suggest, the philosophy of mind advanced in the Deduction belongs (...)
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  48. Wie kann die transzendentale Apperzeption ›gehaltvoll‹ werden bzw. die Rezeptivität spontan?Patrick Grüneberg - 2009 - Fichte-Studien 33:49-63.
    Das natürlich vorkommende Phänomen, das den Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung ausmacht, ist das empirische Bewußtsein. Betrachtet man die Inhalte des menschlichen, empirischen Bewußtseins, dann fällt auf, daß diese grundsätzlich in zwei Klassen aufgeteilt werden können: Zum einen gibt es spontane Vorstellungen, die der Willkür des empirischen Subjekts unterliegen, etwa Phantasien, Pläne, (Handlungs)entscheidungen oder Spekulationen. Zum anderen hat das Subjekt räumlich und zeitlich strukturierte Vorstellungen, die ihm derart gegeben sind, daß es sich intentional auf Gegenstände und Prozesse innerer und äußerer Wahrnehmung (...)
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  49. Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):981-1010.
    Existing interpretations of Kant’s appeal to the spontaneity of the mind focus almost exclusively on the discussion of pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction. The risk of such a strategy lies in the considerable degree of abstraction at which the argument of the Deduction is carried out: existing interpretations fail to reconnect adequately with any ground-level perspective on our cognitive lives. This paper works in the opposite direction. Drawing on Kant’s suggestion that the most basic picture we can have of (...)
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  50. Poetique de l'ipse: etude sur le Je pense Kantien.Paulo Jesus - 2008 - Bern: Lang.
    Cet ouvrage propose une réinterprétation originale du rôle cognitif du Je pense kantien qui se veut pertinente pour la phénoménologie et pour la philosophie actuelle de l’esprit. L’étude du rapport entre temporalité phénoménale et cognition catégoriale constitue le fil conducteur de cette recherche. Elle mène à la question capitale du statut ultime du Moi, du sens du Je du Je pense. Que désigne-t-il : un épiphénomène contingent, une représentation sui generis, une métareprésentation, un acte indéconstructible, un événement fonctionnel, une forme (...)
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