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  1. added 2019-06-05
    A crítica de Kant à subjetividade cartesiana.Marco Vinícius de Siqueira Côrtes - 2013 - Dissertation, UFPR, Brazil
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  2. added 2019-04-26
    Sorin Baiasu, Kant and Sartre: Rediscovering Critical Ethics London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 Pp. 291, Hbk, £55.00 ISBN: 9780230001503. [REVIEW]Chris Onof - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (2):323-328.
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  3. added 2019-03-28
    The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
    Critical notice of Béatrice Longuenesse's book *I, Me, Mine*.
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  4. added 2019-01-30
    I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  5. added 2019-01-13
    Kant, Metaphysical Space, and the Unity of the Subject.Jessica J. Williams - forthcoming - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress "Nature and Freedom". Berlin, Germany:
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  6. added 2018-08-12
    Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
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  7. added 2018-08-12
    Zelfbewustzijn, objectiviteit en idealisme--over Kant's radicale subjectivisme.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):313-322.
    This is a précis of my book Kant's Radical Subjectivism, to be published as part of a symposium dedicated to the book, with critics Hein van den Berg, Karin de Boer, Henny Blomme en Joris Spigt, including a reply by me. The symposium is in Dutch, but the pre-print uploaded here is in English!
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  8. added 2018-05-11
    What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - forthcoming - In Allais & Callanan (eds.), Kant and Animals. Oxford University Press.
    This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of (...)
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  9. added 2018-03-22
    The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.Addison Ellis - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos (6):138-164.
    Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for (...)
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  10. added 2017-08-23
    The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - forthcoming - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica.
    Perry and Recanati describe I-thoughts or de se thoughts as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the I doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the genesis of the (...)
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  11. added 2017-07-26
    Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 Pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 Hb £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):546-554.
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  12. added 2017-04-24
    Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  13. added 2017-02-09
    Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.
    Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xv + 477.
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  14. added 2017-02-08
    Kant and Thought Insertion.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 3.
    This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations " (Kant, KrV, B132). (...)
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  15. added 2016-12-02
    Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of Experience.Anil Gomes - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):946-969.
    In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...)
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  16. added 2016-08-29
    Kant on the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes - 2016 - In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Recent debates in the interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy have focused on the nature of Kantian intuition and, in particular, on the question of whether intuitions depend for their existence on the existence of their objects. In this paper we show how opposing answers to this question determine different accounts of the nature of Kantian cognition and we suggest that progress can be made on determining the nature of intuition by considering the implications different views have for the nature of (...)
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  17. added 2016-08-02
    Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - London, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction.
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  18. added 2016-04-29
    Self, World, and Art: Metaphysical Topics in Kant and Hegel.Colin Marshall - 2016 - In Sally Sedgwick & Dina Emundts (eds.), Bewusstsein/Consciousness. De Gruyter. pp. 281-285.
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  19. added 2016-03-09
    Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction.A. Ahmed - forthcoming - In T. Goldschmidt K. Pearce (ed.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  20. added 2015-07-13
    The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - 2017 - In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 32-46.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  21. added 2014-03-21
    Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.Richard Brown - manuscript
    [written in 2002/2003 while I was a graduate student at the University of Connecticut and ultimately submitted as part of my qualifying exam for the Masters of Philosophy] The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of (...)
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  22. added 2014-03-19
    Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction.Corey W. Dyck - 2006 - Kantian Review 11:29-54.
    Few of Kant’s doctrines are as difficult to understand as that of self-affection. Its brief career in the published literature consists principally in its unheralded introduction in the Transcendental Aesthetic and unexpected re-appearance at a key moment in the Deduction chapter in the B edition of the first Critique. Kant’s commentators, confronted with the difficulty of this doctrine, have naturally resorted to various strategies of clarification, ranging from distinguishing between empirical and transcendental self-affection, divorcing self-affection from the claims of self-knowledge (...)
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  23. added 2014-03-09
    Reflection, Enlightenment, and the Significance of Spontaneity in Kant.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):981-1010.
    Existing interpretations of Kant’s appeal to the spontaneity of the mind focus almost exclusively on the discussion of pure apperception in the Transcendental Deduction. The risk of such a strategy lies in the considerable degree of abstraction at which the argument of the Deduction is carried out: existing interpretations fail to reconnect adequately with any ground-level perspective on our cognitive lives. This paper works in the opposite direction. Drawing on Kant’s suggestion that the most basic picture we can have of (...)
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  24. added 2014-03-04
    Kant's Argument for the Apperception Principle.Melissa McBay Merritt - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):59-84.
    Abstract: My aim is to reconstruct Kant's argument for the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception. I reconstruct Kant's argument in stages, first showing why thinking should be conceived as an activity of synthesis (as opposed to attention), and then showing why the unity or coherence of a subject's representations should depend upon an a priori synthesis. The guiding thread of my account is Kant's conception of enlightenment: as I suggest, the philosophy of mind advanced in the Deduction belongs (...)
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  25. added 2013-12-07
    Apperzeption und idealrealistische Begründung.Patrick Grüneberg - 2011 - In Elena Ficara (ed.), Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Königshausen & Neumann. pp. 221--230.
    Das Projekt einer Begründung der Philosophie, insbesondere der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, verbindet sich programmatisch mit dem kritischen Werk Kants und dort mit dem Konzept der transzendentalen Apperzeption. Dieser „höchste Punkt“ bildete seinerseits auch einen der zentralen Anknüpfungspunkte nachfolgender idealistischer Entwürfe und sich daraus entwickelnder Systeme. Die nachkantische Entwicklung wird dabei häufig mit dem Rubrum einer spekulativen Überhöhung des transzendentalen Kritizismus Kants belegt. Dabei ging es Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer – um nur die prominenten Vertreter zu nennen – in erster Linie (...)
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  26. added 2013-12-07
    Wie kann die transzendentale Apperzeption ›gehaltvoll‹ werden bzw. die Rezeptivität spontan?Patrick Grüneberg - 2009 - Fichte-Studien 33:49-63.
    Das natürlich vorkommende Phänomen, das den Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung ausmacht, ist das empirische Bewußtsein. Betrachtet man die Inhalte des menschlichen, empirischen Bewußtseins, dann fällt auf, daß diese grundsätzlich in zwei Klassen aufgeteilt werden können: Zum einen gibt es spontane Vorstellungen, die der Willkür des empirischen Subjekts unterliegen, etwa Phantasien, Pläne, (Handlungs)entscheidungen oder Spekulationen. Zum anderen hat das Subjekt räumlich und zeitlich strukturierte Vorstellungen, die ihm derart gegeben sind, daß es sich intentional auf Gegenstände und Prozesse innerer und äußerer Wahrnehmung (...)
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  27. added 2012-03-10
    Consciousness and Personal Identity.Owen Ware & Donald C. Ainslie - 2014 - In Aaron Garrett (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 245-264.
    This paper offers an overview of consciousness and personal identity in eighteenth-century philosophy. Locke introduces the concept of persons as subjects of consciousness who also simultaneously recognize themselves as such subjects. Hume, however, argues that minds are nothing but bundles of perceptions, lacking intrinsic unity at a time or across time. Yet Hume thinks our emotional responses to one another mean that persons in everyday life are defined by their virtues, vices, bodily qualities, property, riches, and the like. Rousseau also (...)
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  28. added 2011-09-15
    On Strawson on Kantian Apperception.Dennis Schulting - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):257-271.
    a revised version of the published version is uploaded here.
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