Results for 'nonsense'

125 found
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  1. Nonsense and the Dialectic of Order.Viatcheslav Vetrov - 2021 - In The Linguistic Picture of the World: Alice's Adventures in Many Languages. Baden-Baden, Deutschland: pp. 61-94.
    In this chapter, Nonsense is approached as a category that reveals a close relation both to order and disorder, rationality and illogicality, conventionality and arbitrariness, reality and dream. Among its various illustrations, quite a prominent role is assigned to the Duchess’ sentence, which, in spite of being universally acknowledged as one of the best pieces of Nonsense, is rarely discussed in detail in philosophical and literary investigations: ‘Be what you would seem to be’ - or, if you’d like (...)
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  2. Nonsense: a user's guide.Manish Oza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Many philosophers suppose that sometimes we think we are saying or thinking something meaningful when in fact we’re not saying or thinking anything at all: we are producing nonsense. But what is nonsense? An account of nonsense must, I argue, meet two constraints. The first constraint requires that nonsense can be rationally engaged with, not just mentioned. In particular, we can reason with nonsense and use it within that-clauses. An account which fails to meet this (...)
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  3. Pragmatic Nonsense.Ricardo Peraça Cavassane, Itala M. Loffredo D'Ottaviano & Felipe Sobreira Abrahão - manuscript
    Inspired by the early Wittgenstein’s concept of nonsense (meaning that which lies beyond the limits of language), we define two different, yet complementary, types of nonsense: formal nonsense and pragmatic nonsense. The simpler notion of formal nonsense is initially defined within Tarski’s semantic theory of truth; the notion of pragmatic nonsense, by its turn, is formulated within the context of the theory of pragmatic truth, also known as quasi-truth, as formalized by da Costa and (...)
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  4. Purposeful Nonsense, Intersectionality, and the Mission to Save Black Babies.Melissa M. Kozma & Jeanine Weekes Schroer - 2014 - In Namita Goswami, Maeve O'Donavan & Lisa Yount (eds.), Why Race and Gender Still Matter: An Intersectional Approach. Pickering & Chatto. pp. 101-116.
    The competing expressions of ideology flooding the contemporary political landscape have taken a turn toward the absurd. The Radiance Foundation’s recent anti-abortion campaign targeting African-American women, including a series of billboards bearing the slogan “The most dangerous place for an African-American child is in the womb”, is just one example of political "discourse" that is both infuriating and confounding. Discourse with these features – problematic intelligibility, disinterest in the truth, and inflammatory rhetoric – has become increasingly common in politics, the (...)
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  5. Nonsense: A Riddle Without Solution.Gilad Nir - forthcoming - In James Conant & Gilad Nir (eds.), Early Analytic Philosophy: Origins and Transformations.
    This paper concerns Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical and mathematical problems. Both in his earlier and in his later writings Wittgenstein grapples with the tendency of philosophers to misconstrue the nature of the difficulties that they are facing. Whereas philosophers tend to assume that their problems are comparable to those that come up in the sciences, and take these problems to consist in questions the answers to which will provide them with substantive knowledge, Wittgenstein compares philosophical problems with riddles. What is (...)
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  6. Nonsense and Visual Evanescence.Clare Mac Cumhaill - 2018 - In Clare Mac Cumhaill & Thomas Crowther (eds.), Perceptual Ephemera. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 289-311.
    I introduce a perceptual phenomenon so far overlooked in the philosophical literature: ‘visual evanescence’. ‘Evanescent’ objects are those that due to their structured visible appearances have a tendency to vanish or evanesce from sight at certain places and for certain ‘biologically apt’ perceivers. Paradigmatically evanescent objects are those associated with certain forms of animal camouflage. I show that reflection on visual evanescence helps create conceptual room for a treatment of looks statements not explicit in the contemporary literature, one which takes (...)
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  7. The Riddle of Understanding Nonsense.Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):372–411.
    Typically, if I understand a sentence, then it expresses a proposition that I entertain. Nonsensical sentences don’t express propositions, but there are contexts in which we talk about understanding nonsensical sentences. For example, we accept various kinds of semantically defective sentences in fiction, philosophy, and everyday life. Furthermore, it is a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to say that it implies anything or is implied by other sentences. Semantically uninterpreted sentences don’t have (...)
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  8. Ineffability and Nonsense.Adrian W. Moore - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77:169-223.
    [A. W. Moore] There are criteria of ineffability whereby, even if the concept of ineffability can never serve to modify truth, it can sometimes serve to modify other things, specifically understanding. This allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein's Tractatus and those who adopt the new reading recently championed by Diamond, Conant, and others. By maintaining that what the nonsense in the Tractatus is supposed to convey is ineffable understanding, rather (...)
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  9. Ineffability and nonsense.A. W. Moore - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):169–193.
    [A. W. Moore] Criteria of ineffability are presented which, it is claimed, preclude the possibility of truths that are ineffable, but not the possibility of other things that are ineffable—not even the possibility of other things that are non-trivially ineffable. Specifically, they do not preclude the possibility of states of understanding that are ineffable. This, it is argued, allows for a reappraisal of the dispute between those who adopt a traditional reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and those who adopt the new (...)
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  10. Nonsense on Stilts about Science: Field Adventures of a Scientist- Philosopher.Massimo Pigliucci - 2012 - In J. Goodwin (ed.), Between Scientists and Citizens. CreateSpace.
    Public discussions of science are often marred by two pernicious phenomena: a widespread rejection of scientific findings (e.g., the reality of anthropogenic climate change, the conclusion that vaccines do not cause autism, or the validity of evolutionary theory), coupled with an equally common acceptance of pseudoscientific notions (e.g., homeopathy, psychic readings, telepathy, tall tales about alien abductions, and so forth). The typical reaction by scientists and science educators is to decry the sorry state of science literacy among the general public, (...)
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  11. Non-reflexive Nonsense: Proof-Theory for Paracomplete Weak Kleene Logic.Bruno Da Ré, Damian Szmuc & María Inés Corbalán - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-17.
    Our aim is to provide a sequent calculus whose external consequence relation coincides with the three-valued paracomplete logic `of nonsense' introduced by Dmitry Bochvar and, independently, presented as the weak Kleene logic K3W by Stephen C. Kleene. The main features of this calculus are (i) that it is non-reflexive, i.e., Identity is not included as an explicit rule (although a restricted form of it with premises is derivable); (ii) that it includes rules where no variable-inclusion conditions are attached; and (...)
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  12.  93
    On Woodruff’s Constructive Nonsense Logic.Jonas R. B. Arenhart & Hitoshi Omori - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-20.
    Sören Halldén’s logic of nonsense is one of the most well-known many-valued logics available in the literature. In this paper, we discuss Peter Woodruff’s as yet rather unexplored attempt to advance a version of such a logic built on the top of a constructive logical basis. We start by recalling the basics of Woodruff’s system and by bringing to light some of its notable features. We then go on to elaborate on some of the difficulties attached to it; on (...)
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  13. Wittgenstein's Later Nonsense.Daniel Whiting - 2022 - In Christoph C. Pfisterer, Nicole Rathgeb & Eva Schmidt (eds.), Wittgenstein and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Hans-Johann Glock. New York: Routledge.
    According to an influential reading of his later philosophy, Wittgenstein thinks that nonsense can result from combining expressions in ways prohibited by the rules to which their use is subject. According to another influential reading, the later Wittgenstein thinks that nonsense only ever results from privation—that is, from a failure to assign a meaning to one or more of the relevant expressions. This chapter challenges Glock’s defence of the view that the later Wittgenstein allows for combinatorial nonsense. (...)
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  14. This is Nonsense.Gregor Damschen - 2008 - The Reasoner 2 (10):6-8.
    In his Paradoxes (1995: Cambridge University Press: 149) Mark Sainsbury presents the following pair of sentences: Line 1: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Line 2: The sentence written on Line 1 is nonsense. Sainsbury (1995: 149, 154) here makes three assertions: (1) The sentence in Line 1 is so viciously self-referential that it falls into the truth-value gap. The sentence is really nonsense. (2) The sentence in Line 2 is by contrast true. For it (...)
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  15. A Defence of the Austere View of Nonsense.Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-30.
    The austere view of nonsense says that the source of nonsense is not a violation of the rules of logical syntax, but nonsense is always due to a lack of meaning in one of the components of a sentence. In other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for nonsensicality is that no meaning has been assigned to a constituent in a sentence. The austere conception is the key ingredient of the resolute reading of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that presents (...)
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  16. Do philosophers talk nonsense?: an inquiry into the possibility of illusions of meaning.Ian Dearden - 2013 - London: Rellet Press.
    Is there such a thing as philosophical nonsense? For the best part of a century now philosophers have been accusing each other of talking nonsense. This practice presupposes that people can be wrong in thinking they mean anything by what they say, that there can be an illusion of meaning. But the assumption that illusions of meaning are possible has not, the author believes, been seriously examined; nor has the problem of how such illusions could be diagnosed been (...)
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  17. Making Sense of Nonsense: Navigating Through the West's Current Quagmire.Scott D. G. Ventureyra (ed.) - 2022 - Ottawa, ON, Canada: True Freedom Press.
    In recent years, there has been a concerted attack on many of the precepts of Western civilization relating to the concept of God, truth, Christianity, morality, sex, the family, and even modern science, especially biology. The concern of this volume is to explore these and other attacks through the tools of philosophy, theology, science, and intuition. It seeks to bring clarity to the ongoing struggle of Western civilization to preserve its values and traditions. -/- The West is crumbling at an (...)
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  18. A Lógica, o Nonsense E a Filosofia da Lógica de Lewis Carroll.John Lennon Lindemann - 2021 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
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  19. Deleuze and the Enaction of Nonsense.William Short, Alistair Welchman & Wilson Shearin - 2014 - In Tom Froese & Massimiliano Cappuccio (eds.), Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making. pp. 238-265.
    This chapter examines the ways in which French philosopher Gilles Deleuze offers conceptual resources for an enactive account of language, in particular his extensive consideration of language in The Logic of Sense. Specifically, Deleuze’s distinction between the nonsense of Lewis Carroll’s portmanteau creations and that of Antonin Artaud’s “transla- tion” of Carroll’s Jabberwocky highlights the need for an enactive, rather than merely embodied, approach to sense-making, particularly with regard to the general category of what Jakobson and Halle (1956) call (...)
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  20. Panentheism and the “Most Nonsensical Superstition” of Polytheism.Swami Medhananda - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (2).
    The German philosopher K.C.F. Krause found deep conceptual parallels between his panentheistic system and the Indian philosophy of Vedānta. This article critically examines Krause’s understanding of Vedānta and popular Hindu religion. I argue that while Krause was correct in viewing the mystical panentheistic doctrine of Vedānta as a precursor to his own philosophy, he was also frequently misled by unreliable translations and secondary texts. Krause, I suggest, was mistaken in characterizing the Hindu practice of image worship as “polytheism” and “idolatry,” (...)
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  21. The Everyday's Fabulous Beyond: Nonsense, Parable and the Ethics of the Literary in Kafka and Wittgenstein.Karen Zumhagen-Yekplé - 2013 - Comparative Literature 64 (4):429-445.
    This essay takes up the significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy for our understanding of literature (and vice versa) through a comparative reading of the stakes and aims of Kafka's and Wittgenstein's respective circa 1922 puzzle texts “Von den Gleichnissen” (“On Parables”) and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The essay builds upon the so-called resolute program of Wittgenstein interpretation developed by Cora Diamond, James Conant, and others, bringing its insights to bear on Kafka's perplexing work. The essay explores the ethical weight of these two (...)
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  22. Wittgenstein's Tractatus: True Thoughts and Nonsensical Propositions.Andrew Lugg - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):332-347.
    Study of Wittgenstein's claim in the Preface of the Tractatus that his thoughts are unassailably true and his declaration at the end of the work that his propositions are nonsensical.
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  23. The Sense and Nonsense of Criminalizing Transfers of Obscene.Dennis J. Baker - 2008 - Singapore Law Review 26:126-160.
    The recent distribution of nude photos of a number of high profile Hong Kong celebrities has provoked intense discussion about the state of Hong Kong's obscenity and indecency laws. In this paper, I argue that Hong Kong's laws prohibiting the transfer of obscene and indecent information and images between consenting adults are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance is under-inclusive in that it does not adequately criminalise grave violations of privacy. It is also over-inclusive (...)
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  24. Making Sense of the Conceptual Nonsense 'Trustworthy AI'.Ori Freiman - 2022 - AI and Ethics 4.
    Following the publication of numerous ethical principles and guidelines, the concept of 'Trustworthy AI' has become widely used. However, several AI ethicists argue against using this concept, often backing their arguments with decades of conceptual analyses made by scholars who studied the concept of trust. In this paper, I describe the historical-philosophical roots of their objection and the premise that trust entails a human quality that technologies lack. Then, I review existing criticisms about 'Trustworthy AI' and the consequence of ignoring (...)
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  25. Resolute Readings of Wittgenstein and Nonsense.Joseph Ulatowski - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (10).
    The aim of this paper is to show that a corollary of resolute readings of Wittgenstein’s conception of nonsense cannot be sustained. First, I describe the corollary. Next, I point out the relevance to it of Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblance concepts. Then, I survey some typical uses of nonsense to see what they bring to an ordinary language treatment of the word “nonsense” and its relatives. I will subsequently consider the objection, on behalf of a resolute (...)
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  26. Carnap and Quine on Sense and Nonsense.James Andrew Smith - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (10):1-28.
    I offer an interpretation of Carnap and Quine’s views on cognitive significance and insignificance. The basic idea behind their views is as follows: to judge an expression is insignificant is to recommend it not be used in or explicated into languages used to express truth-valued judgments in inquiry; to judge an expression is significant is to recommend it be used in or explicated into such languages. These judgments are pragmatic judgments, made in light of purposes for language use in inquiry. (...)
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  27. The new Wittgenstein: A critique.Ian Proops - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):375–404.
    A critique of Cora Diamond's influential approach to reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus. According to Diamond, the Tractatus contains no substantive philosophical theses, but is rather merely an especially subtle and sophisticated exercise in the unmasking of nonsense. I argue that no remotely convincing case for this interpretive thesis has yet been made--either by Diamond herself, or by the numerous defenders of this so-called "resolute" reading (so-called by those who wish to style themselves as resolute; their opponents tend to reject this (...)
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  28. Logical syntax in the tractatus.Ian Proops - 2001 - In Richard Gaskin (ed.), Grammar in early twentieth-century philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 163.
    An essay on Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense and its relation to his idea that "logic must take care of itself". I explain how Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism is supposed to resolve Russell's paradox, and I offer an alternative to Cora Diamond's influential account of Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the error in the so-called "natural view" of nonsense.
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  29. ‘Een mogelijk teken moet ook kunnen betekenen’. Hacker over onzin en verkeerd gebruik in Wittgensteins Tractatus.Wim Vanrie - 2023 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 115 (2):209-222.
    This paper critically discusses Hacker’s reading of nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus in terms of his notion of misuse, which is taken to consist in the violation of rules of logical syntax. I argue that Hacker’s reading relies on an equivocation between sign and symbol: what is ‘misused’ is a mere sign, but the verdict of nonsensicality relies on seeing it as a symbol. Although Hacker seeks to distance himself from resolute readings – according to which nonsense always consists (...)
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  30. Cora Diamond.Simon DeDeo - 2000 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 8 (1):69-81.
    An interview conducted at the University of Virginia in October 1999, covering Diamond's work on Wittgenstein, nonsense and riddles, moral realism and skepticism, Peter Singer and animal rights, and the role of literature in philosophy. Also collected in "Philosophers in Conversation: Interviews from the Harvard Review of Philosophy", S. Phineas Upham (Editor), Routledge (2002).
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  31. The Metaphysical Subject and Logical Space: Solipsism and Singularity in the Tractatus.M. Curtis Allen - 2018 - Open Philosophy 1 (1):277-289.
    This essay presents a heterodox reading of the issue of solipsism in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, out of which the whole of the TLP can be re-read. Inspired by, though not dependent on, the themes of virtuality and singularity found in Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’, Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘logical space’ is here complexly related to the paradoxes of the ‘metaphysical subject’ and ‘solipsism,’ within which the strictures of sense are defined, and through which the logico-pictorial scaffolding of the TLP precipitates its own (...)
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  32. Wittgenstein on Reasonable Doubt and Calling Bullshit.Frank Hernandez - 2021 - Acta Cogitata: An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy 1 (9):74-88.
    In this essay I analyze a passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. This excerpt contains the expression “O, rubbish!” (Ach Unsinn), which I consider to be closely related to the notions of “bullshit” developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald A. Cohen. The relevance of this essay is illustrated with lively examples, both related to contemporary society and identified by Wittgenstein about 70 years ago. The paper is organized in six sections containing 1) an introduction to the topic, 2) an explanation (...)
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  33. The New Wittgenstein (review). [REVIEW]Anton Alterman - 2001 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (3):456-457.
    The essays in the book have two main emphases. Regarding the late Wittgenstein, they focus on the idea that skepticism about rule-following is undermined, indeed incoherent, in virtue of Wittgenstein's emphasis on context of utterance and "forms of life" (roughly the "community" view of his later work). In the early Wittgenstein they take a "resolute" position on nonsense, saying that he did not believe there was some ineffable or informative nonsense, but only pure and utter nonsense, including (...)
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  34. Coercive Theories of Meaning or Why Language Shouldn't Matter (So Much) to Philosophy.Charles R. Pigden - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 53 (210):151.
    This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of the totalitarian linguistic tactics (...)
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  35. Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World.Sebastian Sunday Grève - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1023-1031.
    This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that _cannot_ be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. (...)
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  36. Stop Talking about Fake News!Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1033-1065.
    Since 2016, there has been an explosion of academic work and journalism that fixes its subject matter using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. In this paper, I argue that this terminology is not up to scratch, and that academics and journalists ought to completely stop using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. I set out three arguments for abandonment. First, that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ do not have stable public meanings, entailing that they are either nonsense, context-sensitive, or (...)
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  37. Defending Juche Against an Uncharitable Analysis.Hannah H. Kim - 2023 - Apa Studies: Asian and Asian American Philosophy 22 (2):12-17.
    In this article, I aim to do two things: first, introduce Juche, the official philosophy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”), and second, defend Juche against Alzo David-West’s allegation that it is a nonsensical philosophy. I organize David-West’s complaints into two major strands—that Juche’s axiom is too vague to be of philosophical use and that Juche makes too stark a distinction between human vs. everything else—and offer responses to both strands. My goal isn’t to defend the regime, (...)
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  38. Understanding Misunderstanding.Gilad Nir - 2023 - In Carla Carmona, David Perez-Chico & Chon Tejedor (eds.), Intercultural Understanding After Wittgenstein. Anthem.
    Wittgenstein seeks to throw light on our concept of understanding by looking at how misunderstandings arise and what kinds of failure they involve. He discerns a peculiar sort of misunderstanding in the writings of the social anthropologist James Frazer. In Frazer’s hands, the anthropological project of enabling us to understand human behavior seems to yield the result that there are certain forms of human behavior that simply cannot be understood. The source of Frazer’s misunderstanding, according to Wittgenstein, is that he (...)
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  39. Animal Rights or just Human Wrongs?Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2012 - In Animal Rights: Past and Present Perspectives. Berlin: Logos Verlag. pp. 279-291.
    Reportedly ever since Pythagoras, but possibly much earlier, humans have been concerned about the way non human animals (henceforward “animals” for convenience) should be treated. By late antiquity all main traditions with regard to this issue had already been established and consolidated, and were only slightly modified during the centuries that followed. Until the nineteenth century philosophers tended to focus primarily on the ontological status of animals, to wit on whether – and to what degree – animals are actually rational (...)
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  40. An interpretation of political argument.William Bosworth - 2020 - European Journal of Political Theory 19 (3):293-313.
    How do we determine whether individuals accept the actual consistency of a political argument instead of just its rhetorical good looks? This article answers this question by proposing an interpretation of political argument within the constraints of political liberalism. It utilises modern developments in the philosophy of logic and language to reclaim ‘meaningless nonsense’ from use as a partisan war cry and to build up political argument as something more than a power struggle between competing conceptions of the good. (...)
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  41. Another Look at Husserl’s Treatment of the Thing in Itself.Matt Bower - manuscript
    It is a familiar story that, where Kant humbly draws a line beyond which cognition can’t reach, Husserl presses forward to show how we can cognize beyond that limit. Kant supposes that cognition is bound to sensibility and that what we experience in sensibility is mere appearance that does not inform us about the intrinsic nature of things in themselves. By contrast, for Husserl, it makes no sense to say we experience anything other than things in themselves when we enjoy (...)
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  42. Might anything be plain good?Thomas Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3335-3346.
    G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is not a predicative adjective, but only ever an attributive adjective: just like ‘big.’ And just as there is no such thing as plain bigness but only ever big for or as a so-and-so, there is also no such thing as plain goodness. They conclude that Moore’s goodness is thus a nonsense. However attention has (...)
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  43. Defining LFIs and LFUs in extensions of infectious logics.Szmuc Damian Enrique - 2016 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (4):286-314.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the peculiar case of infectious logics, a group of systems obtained generalizing the semantic behavior characteristic of the -fragment of the logics of nonsense, such as the ones due to Bochvar and Halldén, among others. Here, we extend these logics with classical negations, and we furthermore show that some of these extended systems can be properly regarded as logics of formal inconsistency and logics of formal undeterminedness.
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  44. Ramsification and the Ramifications of Prior's Puzzle.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):935-961.
    Ramsification is a well-known method of defining theoretical terms that figures centrally in a wide range of debates in metaphysics. Prior's puzzle is the puzzle of why, given the assumption that that-clauses denote propositions, substitution of "the proposition that P" for "that P" within the complements of many propositional attitude verbs sometimes fails to preserve truth, and other times fails to preserve grammaticality. On the surface, Ramsification and Prior's puzzle appear to have little to do with each other. But Prior's (...)
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  45. Wittgenstein on Varieties of the Absurd in the Music of Interwar Austria.Eran Guter - 2022 - In Zeit der Unkultur. Ludwig Wittgenstein im Österreich der Zwischenkriegszeit. Vienna: NoPress. pp. 185-202.
    In this essay I take the opportunity to recast some insights from my extensive study over the last decade of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music into a coherent and concise portrayal of Wittgenstein’s philosophical underpinning and upshots pertaining to his perception of the modern music scene in interwar Austria. The gist of the present essay is to show that, for better or for worse, Wittgenstein’s personal taste in music was powered by philosophical reasoning, which was organic to his philosophical development, and (...)
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  46. Naming the concept horse.Michael Price - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2727-2743.
    Frege’s rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim—that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term—has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman’s argument for (...)
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  47. Is it possible to give scientific solutions to Grand Challenges? On the idea of grand challenges for life science research.Sophia Efstathiou - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 56:46-61.
    This paper argues that challenges that are grand in scope such as "lifelong health and wellbeing", "climate action", or "food security" cannot be addressed through scientific research only. Indeed scientific research could inhibit addressing such challenges if scientific analysis constrains the multiple possible understandings of these challenges into already available scientific categories and concepts without translating between these and everyday concerns. This argument builds on work in philosophy of science and race to postulate a process through which non-scientific notions become (...)
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  48. Words Fail Me. (Stanley Cavell's Life out of Music).William Day - 2020 - In David LaRocca (ed.), Inheriting Stanley Cavell: Memories, Dreams, Reflections. New York: Bloomsbury. pp. 187-97.
    Stanley Cavell isn't the first to arrive at philosophy through a life with music. Nor is he the first whose philosophical practice bears the marks of that life. Much of Cavell's life with music is confirmed for the world in his philosophical autobiography Little Did I Know. A central moment in that book is Cavell's describing the realization that he was to leave his musical career behind – for what exactly, he did not yet know. He connects the memory-shock of (...)
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  49. Philosophy (and Wissenschaft) without Politics? Schlick on Nietzsche, German Idealism, and Militarism.Andreas Vrahimis - 2021 - In Christian Damböck & Adam Tamas Tuboly (eds.), The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: The Mission of Logical Empiricism. Springer. pp. 53-84.
    With the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, there emerged two controversies related to the responsibility of philosophical ideas for the rise of German militarism. The first, mainly journalistic, controversy concerned the influence that Nietzsche’s ideas may have had on what British propagandists portrayed as the ruthlessly amoral German foreign policy. This soon gave way to a second controversy, waged primarily among academics, concerning the purportedly vicious political outcomes of German Idealism, from Kant through to Fichte, Schelling, and (...)
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  50. Berkeley's case against realism about dynamics.Lisa Downing - 1995 - In Robert G. Muehlmann (ed.), Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays. The Pennsylvania State University Press. pp. 197--214.
    While De Motu, Berkeley's treatise on the philosophical foundations of mechanics, has frequently been cited for the surprisingly modern ring of certain of its passages, it has not often been taken as seriously as Berkeley hoped it would be. Even A.A. Luce, in his editor's introduction to De Motu, describes it as a modest work, of limited scope. Luce writes: The De Motu is written in good, correct Latin, but in construction and balance the workmanship falls below Berkeley's usual standards. (...)
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