The Truth About Kant On Lies

In Clancy Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press (2009)
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Abstract

In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including those who are bent on harming innocent others.

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James Mahon
Lehman College (CUNY)

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