Kant’s One Self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself Distinction

Kant-Studien 104 (4):421-441 (2013)
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Kant’s transcendental idealism hinges on a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. The debate about how to understand this distinction has largely ignored the way that Kant applies this distinction to the self. I argue that this is a mistake, and that Kant’s acceptance of a single, unified self in both his theoretical and practical philosophy causes serious problems for the ‘two-world’ interpretation of his idealism.
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Archival date: 2013-05-12
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