Lying: Knowledge or belief?

Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460 (2021)
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Abstract

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

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Neri Marsili
Universitat de Barcelona

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