Physics and Common Sense: A Critique of Physicalism, MA thesis, University of Manchester Library

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 16 (February):295-311 (1965)
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Abstract
In this paper I set out to solve the problem of how the world as we experience it, full of colours and other sensory qualities, and our inner experiences, can be reconciled with physics. I discuss and reject the views of J. J. C. Smart and Rom Harré. I argue that physics is concerned only to describe a selected aspect of all that there is – the causal aspect which determines how events evolve. Colours and other sensory qualities, lacking causal efficacy, are ignored by physics and cannot be predicted by physical theory. Even though physics is silent about sensory qualities, they nevertheless exist objectively in the world – in one sense of “objective” at least.
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1966
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MAXPAC-2
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First archival date: 2011-03-12
Latest version: 1 (2011-03-14)
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