Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 48 (1):171-187 (2016)
AbstractThis paper critically assesses the possibility of moral enhancement with ambient intelligence technologies and artiﬁcial intelligence presented in Savulescu and Maslen (2015). The main problem with their proposal is that it is not robust enough to play a normative role in users’ behavior. A more promising approach, and the one presented in the paper, relies on an artiﬁ-cial moral reasoning engine, which is designed to present its users with moral arguments grounded in ﬁrst-order normative theories, such as Kantianism or utilitarianism, that reason-responsive people can be persuaded by. This proposal can play a normative role and it is also a more promising avenue towards moral enhancement. It is more promising because such a system can be designed to take advantage of the sometimes undue trust that people put in automated technologies. We could therefore expect a well-designed moral reasoner system to be able to persuade people that may not be persuaded by similar arguments from other people. So, all things considered, there is hope in artiﬁcial intelli-gence for moral enhancement, but not in artiﬁcial intelligence that relies solely on ambient intelligence technologies.
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