Perceiving secondary qualities

Philosophical Studies 181 (10) (2024)
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Abstract

Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities than into the nature of primary qualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard Russellian variety of the content view can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary and secondary qualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, while secondary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions.

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Boyd Millar
Trent University

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