Anti-Realism and Anti-Revisionism in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics

Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3):451-474 (2020)
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Abstract
Since the publication of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein’s interpreters have endeavored to reconcile his general constructivist/anti-realist attitude towards mathematics with his confessed anti-revisionary philosophy. In this article, the author revisits the issue and presents a solution. The basic idea consists in exploring the fact that the so-called “non-constructive results” could be interpreted so that they do not appear non-constructive at all. The author substantiates this solution by showing how the translation of mathematical results, given by the possibility of translation between logics, can be seen as a tool for partially implementing the solution Wittgenstein had in mind.
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Archival date: 2021-04-16
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