How to Condorcet a Goldman

Episteme 12 (3):413-425 (2015)
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In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen

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