Objectivity in Mathematics, Without Mathematical Objects†

Philosophia Mathematica 29 (3):318-352 (2021)
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Abstract

I identify two reasons for believing in the objectivity of mathematical knowledge: apparent objectivity and applications in science. Focusing on arithmetic, I analyze platonism and cognitive nativism in terms of explaining these two reasons. After establishing that both theories run into difficulties, I present an alternative epistemological account that combines the theoretical frameworks of enculturation and cumulative cultural evolution. I show that this account can explain why arithmetical knowledge appears to be objective and has scientific applications. Finally, I will argue that, while this account is compatible with platonist metaphysics, it does not require postulating mind-independent mathematical objects.

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Markus Pantsar
Aachen University of Technology

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