Against Mathematical Convenientism

Axiomathes 26 (2):115-122 (2016)
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Abstract

Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘ mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument.

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Seungbae Park
Ulsan National Institute Of Science And Technology

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