Can Mathematical Objects Be Causally Efficacious?

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Callard (2007) argues that it is metaphysically possible that a mathematical object, although abstract, causally affects the brain. I raise the following objections. First, a successful defence of mathematical realism requires not merely the metaphysical possibility but rather the actuality that a mathematical object affects the brain. Second, mathematical realists need to confront a set of three pertinent issues: why a mathematical object does not affect other concrete objects and other mathematical objects, what counts as a mathematical object, and how we can have knowledge about an unchanging object.
Reprint years
2018, 2019
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2017-11-01
Latest version: 3 (2018-02-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
285 ( #19,001 of 56,892 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #17,880 of 56,892 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.