In Defense of Mathematical Inferentialism

Analysis and Metaphysics 16:70-83 (2017)
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Abstract
I defend a new position in philosophy of mathematics that I call mathematical inferentialism. It holds that a mathematical sentence can perform the function of facilitating deductive inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if all of its concrete consequences are true, that the abstract world does not exist, and that we acquire mathematical knowledge by confirming concrete sentences. Mathematical inferentialism has several advantages over mathematical realism and fictionalism.
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First archival date: 2017-03-11
Latest version: 4 (2017-08-15)
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