A Mathematical Model of Quantum Computer by Both Arithmetic and Set Theory

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Abstract
A practical viewpoint links reality, representation, and language to calculation by the concept of Turing (1936) machine being the mathematical model of our computers. After the Gödel incompleteness theorems (1931) or the insolvability of the so-called halting problem (Turing 1936; Church 1936) as to a classical machine of Turing, one of the simplest hypotheses is completeness to be suggested for two ones. That is consistent with the provability of completeness by means of two independent Peano arithmetics discussed in Section I. Many modifications of Turing machines cum quantum ones are researched in Section II for the Halting problem and completeness, and the model of two independent Turing machines seems to generalize them. Then, that pair can be postulated as the formal definition of reality therefore being complete unlike any of them standalone, remaining incomplete without its complementary counterpart. Representation is formal defined as a one-to-one mapping between the two Turing machines, and the set of all those mappings can be considered as “language” therefore including metaphors as mappings different than representation. Section III investigates that formal relation of “reality”, “representation”, and “language” modeled by (at least two) Turing machines. The independence of (two) Turing machines is interpreted by means of game theory and especially of the Nash equilibrium in Section IV. Choice and information as the quantity of choices are involved. That approach seems to be equivalent to that based on set theory and the concept of actual infinity in mathematics and allowing of practical implementations.
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PENAMM-2
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Archival date: 2020-07-31
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2020-07-31

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