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  1. A Contradiction and P=NP Problem.Farzad Didehvar - manuscript
    Here, by introducing a version of “Unexpected hanging paradox” first we try to open a new way and a new explanation for paradoxes, similar to liar paradox. Also, we will show that we have a semantic situation which no syntactical logical system could support it. Finally, we propose a claim in Theory of Computation about the consistency of this Theory. One of the major claim is:Theory of Computation and Classical Logic leads us to a contradiction.
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  2. Complexity of Judgment Aggregation.Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi & Daniele Porello - 2012 - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 45:481--514.
    We analyse the computational complexity of three problems in judgment aggregation: (1) computing a collective judgment from a profile of individual judgments (the winner determination problem); (2) deciding whether a given agent can influence the outcome of a judgment aggregation procedure in her favour by reporting insincere judgments (the strategic manipulation problem); and (3) deciding whether a given judgment aggregation scenario is guaranteed to result in a logically consistent outcome, independently from what the judgments supplied by the individuals are (the (...)
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  3. Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.
    I argue that considerations about computational complexity show that all finite agents need characteristics like those that have been called epistemic virtues. The necessity of these virtues follows in part from the nonexistence of shortcuts, or efficient ways of finding shortcuts, to cognitively expensive routines. It follows that agents must possess the capacities – metavirtues –of developing in advance the cognitive virtues they will need when time and memory are at a premium.
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  4. The Epsilon Calculus and Herbrand Complexity.Georg Moser & Richard Zach - 2006 - Studia Logica 82 (1):133-155.
    Hilbert's ε-calculus is based on an extension of the language of predicate logic by a term-forming operator εx. Two fundamental results about the ε-calculus, the first and second epsilon theorem, play a rôle similar to that which the cut-elimination theorem plays in sequent calculus. In particular, Herbrand's Theorem is a consequence of the epsilon theorems. The paper investigates the epsilon theorems and the complexity of the elimination procedure underlying their proof, as well as the length of Herbrand disjunctions of existential (...)
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  5. Sense and Proof.Carlo Penco & Daniele Porello - 2010 - In M. D'agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani & C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science,. College Publicationss.
    In this paper we give some formal examples of ideas developed by Penco in two papers on the tension inside Frege's notion of sense (see Penco 2003). The paper attempts to compose the tension between semantic and cognitive aspects of sense, through the idea of sense as proof or procedure – not as an alternative to the idea of sense as truth condition, but as complementary to it (as it happens sometimes in the old tradition of procedural semantics).
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  6. Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations.Iris Rooij, Cory Wright & Todd Wareham - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
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  7. The World is an Autology Derived From All Tautologies.Alexandre Harvey Tremblay - manuscript
    We report a mathematical construction that is autological, universal and tautological. The autological property allows the derivation of the laws of physics from the construction, while the other two properties explain why the construction is universally and necessarily applicable to the world. The construction can explain the World at its most fundamental level up to and including the derivation of the familiar laws of physics. It is formulated as a statistical ensemble of feasible mathematics (an algorithmic information theory analog to (...)
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  8. Feasible Mathematics.Alexandre Harvey Tremblay - manuscript
    From algorithmic information theory (and using notions of algorithmic thermodynamics), we introduce *feasible mathematics* as distinct from *universal mathematics*. Feasible mathematics formalizes the intuition that theorems with very long proofs are unprovable within the context of limited computing resources. It is formalized by augmenting the standard construction of Omega with a conjugate-pair that suppresses programs with long runtimes. The domain of the new construction defines feasible mathematics.
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  9. The Incoherence of Heuristically Explaining Coherence.Iris van Rooij & Cory Wright - 2006 - In Ron Sun (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ 07430, USA: pp. 2622.
    Advancement in cognitive science depends, in part, on doing some occasional ‘theoretical housekeeping’. We highlight some conceptual confusions lurking in an important attempt at explaining the human capacity for rational or coherent thought: Thagard & Verbeurgt’s computational-level model of humans’ capacity for making reasonable and truth-conducive abductive inferences (1998; Thagard, 2000). Thagard & Verbeurgt’s model assumes that humans make such inferences by computing a coherence function (f_coh), which takes as input representation networks and their pair-wise constraints and gives as output (...)
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