Representationalism and the problem of vagueness

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PERRAT-2
Upload history
First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2015-11-21)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-09-22

Total views
511 ( #9,150 of 54,695 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #31,954 of 54,695 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.