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Representationalism and the problem of vagueness
Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
Abstract
This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationismAuthor Profiles
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Added to PP
2012-09-22
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1,002 (#18,261)
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111 (#46,046)
2012-09-22
Downloads
1,002 (#18,261)
6 months
111 (#46,046)
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