Representationalism and the problem of vagueness

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism

Author Profiles

Tim Bayne
Monash University
Ryan Perkins
Franciscan University of Steubenville

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-09-22

Downloads
989 (#16,996)

6 months
129 (#34,494)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?