Representationalism and the problem of vagueness

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86 (2013)
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This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism
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Vagueness.Williamson, Timothy

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Access, Phenomenology and Sorites.Sebastián, Miguel Ángel

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