Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference

Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):71-94 (1980)
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Abstract

The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).

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Gilbert Edward Plumer
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign (PhD)

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