Max Scheler, cousin of disjunctivism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide.
Categories
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
RICMSC-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-06-29
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.
Perceptual Content Defended.Schellenberg, Susanna

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-03-10

Total views
104 ( #21,234 of 38,030 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #15,577 of 38,030 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.