No Exception for Belief

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Abstract
This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts with the common idea that in the case of belief, there are two different incommensurable senses of rationality, one of which is distinctively epistemic. I present considerations that favor Equal Treatment over these two alternatives, reply to objections, and criticize some arguments for Evidentialism. I also show how Equal Treatment opens the door to a distinctive kind of response to skepticism.
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First archival date: 2015-11-21
Latest version: 2 (2017-05-11)
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David K.
Doxastic Deliberation.Shah, Nishi & David Velleman, J.

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2015-06-25

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