Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

Noûs 53 (1):224-247 (2019)
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In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.

Author Profiles

Renatas Berniūnas
Vilnius University
Hyundeuk Cheon
Seoul National University
Daniel Cohnitz
Utrecht University
7 more


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