In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous (...) research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism. (shrink)
Some metaphysicians believe that metaphysical modality is explainable by the essences of objects. In §II, I spell out the definitional view of essence, and in §III, a working notion of metaphysical explanation. Then, in §IV, I consider and reject five natural ways to explain necessity by essence: in terms of the principle that essential properties can't change, in terms of the supposed obviousness of the necessity of essential truth, in terms of the logical necessity of definitions, in terms of Fine's (...) logic of essence, and in terms of the theory of real definitions. I will conclude that the present evidence favours rejecting the hypothesis that modality is explainable by essence. (shrink)
Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen (...) different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)
En este artículo discuto cómo es que la idea intuitiva de que las cosas podrían cambiar, combinada con principios excesivamente plausibles, nos lleva a la paradoja de Chisholm. Arguyo que la mejor respuesta a esta paradoja –pues efectúa la menor mutilación a nuestros principios teóricos y asunciones intuitivas– es la postura esencialista. Primero expongo algunas motivaciones para hacer una teoría metafísica que explique la modalidad de re. Luego reviso los principios a los que estaremos regresando en el curso del artículo. (...) Entonces muestro cómo ellos, conjuntamente, implican la paradoja de Chisholm. Después reviso las posibles fuentes de esta paradoja, rechazando varias salidas posibles. Argumento que la fuente de la paradoja está en que nuestros principios teóricos son demasiado liberales, y que la opción esencialista subsana este defecto. (shrink)
Los trabajos reunidos en este libro tienen un propósito en común. Aspiran a clarificar las principales tesis de Mainländer y su relación con otros pensadores, por ejemplo, Freud, Schopenhauer, Albert Caraco, Manlio Sgalambro, Emil Cioran, Jorge Luis Borges, entre los más destacados. Enmarcado en sus aportes valiosos, este volumen es un hito cuya vasta sapiencia y rigurosidad resulta más que favorable para la recuperación y difusión de este pensador.
Diariamente vemos noticias sobre políticos irresponsables que rechazan el consejo que los expertos basan en los modelos científicos, o nos encontramos con notas periodísticas que distorsionan los hechos o las teorías. En México, diariamente somos testigos —tanto que se ha vuelto un chiste recurrente— de la evidente incapacidad de la comunidad periodística para cubrir informes técnicos, así como de la dificultad que tienen muchos columnistas para comprender incluso los más básicos conceptos de la estadística. Además, muchas veces nos preguntamos por (...) qué los científicos y las organizaciones de salud parecen estar cambiando constantemente de opinión, contradiciéndose entre sí, o no terminan de ponerse de acuerdo. (shrink)
In this dissertation I introduce, motivate and take the first steps in the realization of, the project of naturalizing modal metaphysics: the transformation of the field into a chapter of the philosophy of science rather than speculative, autonomous metaphysics. -/- In the introduction, I explain the concept of naturalization that I take for granted throughout the dissertation, in addition to objecting to two recent proposals, according to which modal metaphysics --- or some view in the area --- is already a (...) quasi-scientific discipline. -/- Recently, some philosophers have argued that the notion of metaphysical modality is so ill defined that it has little theoretical usefulness. In the second chapter I intend to contribute to such skepticism. First, I observe that each of the proposed marks of the concept, except for factivity, is highly controversial; thus, its logical structure is deeply obscure. The "first principles" approach having failed, I consider the paradigmatic intended applications of the concept, and argue that each makes it a device for a very specific and controversial project, usually with various unnatural commitments: a device, therefore, for which a naturalistic skeptic will find no use. I conclude that there is no well-defined or theoretically useful notion of objective necessity other than logical or physical necessity, and I suggest that naturalization of modal metaphysics can provide more stable methodological foundations. -/- In the third chapter I answer a possible objection against the in-principle viability of the project: that the concept of metaphysical modality cannot be understood through the philosophical analysis of any scientific theory, since metaphysical necessity "transcends" natural necessity, and science only deals with the latter. I argue that the most important arguments for this transcendence thesis fail or face problems that as of today remain unsolved. -/- Let's call the idea that science doesn't need modality "demodalism". Demodalism is a first step in a naturalistic argument for modal antirealism. In the fourth chapter I examine six versions of demodalism to explain why a family of formalisms: spaces of possibility, are (i) used in a quasi-ubiquitous way in mathematized sciences (I provide examples from theoretical computer science to microeconomics), (ii) scientifically interpreted in modal terms, and (iii) used for at least six important tasks: (1) defining laws and theories; (2) define important concepts from different sciences (I give several examples); (3) make essential classifications; (4) provide different types of explanations; (5) provide the connection between theory and statistics, and (6) understand the transition between a theory and its successor (as is the case with quantization procedures). -/- In the fifth chapter I present and defend a naturalized modal ontology. This is a realism about modal structure: realism about constraints. The modal structure of a system are the relationships between its possible states and between its possible states and those of other systems. It is given by the plurality of restrictions to which said system is subject. A constraint is a factor that explains the impossibility of a class of states; I explain this concept further. First, I defend my point of view by rejecting four of their main rivals: constructive empiricism, Humean conventionalism, wave function realism, and the primitive ontology approach, as they fail to make sense of quantum chaos. This is because the field requires the notion of an objective modal structure, and these views have trouble explaining the modal facts of quantum dynamics. Then I suggest that constraint realism supersedes these views in the context of Bohm's standard theory and mechanics, and underpins the study of quantum chaos. Finally, I consider and reject two possible problems for my point of view. -/- A central concern of modal metaphysicians has been to understand the logical system that best characterizes necessity. In the sixth chapter I intend to recover the logical project, as applied to my naturalistic modal metaphysics. Scientists and philosophers of science recognize different degrees of physical necessity, ranging from purely mathematically necessary facts that significantly restrict physical behavior, to kinetic principles, to particular dynamical constraints. I argue that this motivates a multimodal approach to modal logic, and that the time dependence of dynamics motivates a logic of historical necessity. I propose multimodal propositional (classical) logics for Bohmian mechanics and the Everettian theory of many divergent worlds, and I close with a critique of Williamson's recent approach to the logic of state spaces of dynamic systems. (shrink)
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