Ought implies can, asymmetrical freedom, and the practical irrelevance of transcendental freedom

European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):25-42 (2021)
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In this paper, I demonstrate that Kant's commitment to an asymmetry between the control conditions for praise and blame is explained by his endorsement of the principle Ought Implies Can (OIC). I argue that Kant accepts only a relatively weak version of OIC and that he is hence committed only to a relatively weak requirement of alternate possibilities for moral blame. This suggests that whether we are transcendentally free is irrelevant to questions about moral permissibility and moral blameworthiness.

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Matthé Scholten
Ruhr-Universität Bochum


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