Reasons and Agent-neutrality

Philosophical Studies 135 (2):279-306 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper considers the connection between the three-place relation, R is a reason for X to do A and the two-place relation, R is a reason to do A. I consider three views on which the former is to be analyzed in terms of the latter. I argue that these views are widely held, and explain the role that they play in motivating interesting substantive ethical theories. But I reject them in favor of a more obvious analysis, which goes the other way around.

Author's Profile

Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California


Added to PP

226 (#69,904)

6 months
30 (#92,781)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?