In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):375-392 (2017)
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Abstract
Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.
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First archival date: 2017-01-26
Latest version: 2 (2017-10-06)
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References found in this work BETA
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
The Reasons of Love.Frankfurt, Harry G.
Critique of the Power of Judgment.Ginsborg, Hannah; Kant, Immanuel; Guyer, Paul & Matthews, Eric

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2017-01-26

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