In Defense of Comic Pluralism

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):375-392 (2017)
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Abstract

Jokes are sometimes morally objectionable, and sometimes they are not. What’s the relationship between a joke’s being morally objectionable and its being funny? Philosophers’ answers to this question run the gamut. In this paper I present a new argument for the view that the negative moral value of a joke can affect its comedic value both positively and negatively.

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Nathaniel Sharadin
University of Hong Kong

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