Nomothetic Mythology of Propositional Attitudes

Abstract

Physical translation of a mental content must involve a set of causal antecedents A and a set of causal consequents B which instantiate properties that figure in strict laws as antecedent and consequent conditions respectively. Only if there are double-role events in common between A and B capable of migrating to purely A or to purely B in future depending on the role that the mental content play then, psychological anomalism can be established but without any need to give up the type-identity of mental and physical events. This paper argues that belief and desire are explanatorily inextricable likewise.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-10-03

Downloads
48 (#98,687)

6 months
48 (#92,709)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?