Conditionals all the way down

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is usually accepted that unconditional statements are clearer and less problematic than conditional ones. This article goes against this popular belief by advancing the contrarian hypothesis that all unconditional statements can be reduced to conditional ones due to the way our assumptions support our assertions. In fact, considering the coherentist process by which most of our different beliefs mutually support themselves, the only genuine example of unconditional statements are cases of self-justified beliefs, but these examples are controversial and few and far between. The distinction between unconditional and conditional statements is similar to the distinction between assumptions and premises in that is a largely conventional idealisation that results from our attempts to limit epistemic complexity.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
SILCAT-3
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-08-27
Latest version: 8 (2021-02-17)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-08-27

Total views
36 ( #52,505 of 57,047 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #35,844 of 57,047 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.