Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351 (2022)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT It is plausible to think that we're rationally required to follow our total evidence. It is also plausible to think that there are coherence requirements on rationality. It is also plausible to think that higher order evidence can be misleading. Several epistemologists have recognized the puzzle these claims generate, and the puzzle seems to have only startling and unattractive solutions that involve the rejection of intuitive principles. Yet Alex Worsnip has recently argued that this puzzle has a tidy, attractive and independently motivated solution that involves rejecting the claim that we're rationally required to follow our total evidence. In what follows I argue that this solution fails to solve the fundamental problem for rationality.

Author's Profile

Paul Silva Jr.
University of Cologne

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