On Direct Social Perception

Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482 (2015)
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Abstract
Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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What is Inference?Boghossian, Paul
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Butterfill, Stephen Andrew & Sinigaglia, Corrado

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2015-01-13

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