Imagination and Inner Intuition

In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-123 (2017)
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Abstract
In this paper I return to the question of whether intuition is object-dependent. Kant’s account of the imagination appears to suggest that intuition is not object-dependent. On a recent proposal, however, the imagination is a faculty of merely inner intuition, the inner objects of which exist and are present in the way demanded by object-dependence views, such as Lucy Allais’s relational account. I argue against this proposal on both textual and philosophical grounds. It is inconsistent with what Kant says about how the imagination functions and is ultimately incompatible with the relational account it is supposed to support. Kant’s account of the imagination remains a serious obstacle for the view that intuition is object-dependent.
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Archival date: 2016-05-30
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References found in this work BETA
The Limits of Self-Awareness.Martin, Michael G. F.
On Being Alienated.Martin, Michael G. F.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kant on the Relation of Intuition to Cognition.Stephenson, Andrew & Gomes, Anil

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