Taking the heterogeneity (and unity) of imagination seriously

Philosophers' Imprint 24 (23):1-16 (2024)
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Abstract

It is a commonplace that imagination is heterogeneous: we need to draw a series of cross-cutting distinctions even to begin any serious general discussion of the range of activities we take to be typical instances. The nature of the heterogeneity being exhibited is usually left unclear, however, and thus so are its consequences both for our understanding of imagination and for assessing certain challenges such as reductionism. Here it is argued that we can accept heterogeneity while recognizing important forms of unity among the various kinds of imaginative activity. Four distinct but compatible strategies are considered, three of which have historical precedents in Aristotle’s and Hegel’s work. These proposals yield an interesting and plausible answer to the problem raised by heterogeneity, and have consequences for how we should respond to it. They share a plausible framework for thinking about the relationships among the various activities contemporary thinkers take to involve imagination. However, there are some ways in which deploying them is not straightforward, given some differences between modern approaches and older ones, and they conflict with a common thought about the epistemic status of imagination.

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Nathanael Stein
Florida State University

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