Panpsychism and Non-standard Materialism: Some Comparative Remarks

In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge (2019)
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Much of contemporary philosophy of mind is marked by a dissatisfaction with the two main positions in the field, standard materialism and standard dualism, and hence with the search for alternatives. My concern in this paper is with two such alternatives. The first, which I will call non-standard materialism, is a position I have defended in a number of places, and which may take various forms. The second, panpsychism, has been defended and explored by a number of recent writers. My main goals are: (a) to explain the differences between these positions; and (b) to suggest that non-standard materialism is more plausible than panpsychism.

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Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University


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