Why Ought We Be Good? A Hildebrandian Challenge to Thomistic Normativity Theory

International Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1):71-89 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for the necessity of including what I call “categorical norms” in Thomas Aquinas’s account of the ground of obligation (normativity theory) by drawing on the value phenomenology of Dietrich von Hildebrand. A categorical norm is one conceptually irreducible to any non-normative concept and which obligates us irrespective of pre-existing aims, goals, or desires. I show that Thomistic normativity theory on any plausible reading of Aquinas lacks categorical norms and then raise two serious objections which constitute master arguments against it. The upshot is that this theory requires reform. I end by proposing work remaining for such reform, namely, an expansion of the Thomistic metaphysic and anthropology.

Author's Profile

Joshua Taccolini
Saint Louis University

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-03

Downloads
378 (#61,956)

6 months
114 (#43,666)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?