Moral Failure — Response to Critics

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Abstract
I briefly introduce Moral Failure as a book that brings together philosophical and empirical work in moral psychology to examine moral requirements that are non-negotiable and that contravene the principle that “ought implies can.” I respond to Rivera by arguing that the process of construction that imbues normative requirements with authority need not systematize or eliminate conflicts between normative requirements. My response to Schwartzman clarifies what is problematic about nonideal theorizing that limits itself to offering action-guidance. In response to Kittay, I defend my rejection of “ought implies can,” and consider the implications of the concept of unfair moral requirements.
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Archival date: 2017-09-16
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2016-07-12

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