Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability

Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2261-2276 (2020)
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Abstract
Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; I argue that they do not succeed.
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First archival date: 2019-07-19
Latest version: 3 (2019-07-20)
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