The non-factive turn in epistemology: some hypotheses

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 219-228 (2017)
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Abstract

I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate beliefs, evidence, assertions, and decisions. Recent findings show that these accounts are mistaken. I propose three hypotheses regarding how philosophers defending these accounts got things so wrong. I also consider one potential consequence for the discipline.

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John Turri
University of Waterloo

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