Kant’s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Gerd Buchdahl’s and Michael Friedman’s Accounts

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This article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why the empirical lawfulness of nature does not guarantee the empirical uniformity of nature, I examine the modal status of empirical laws in Kant and argue contra Buchdahl and Friedman that empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other.
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A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.
Critique of the Power of Judgment.Ginsborg, Hannah; Kant, Immanuel; Guyer, Paul & Matthews, Eric
Kant and the Capacity to Judge.Westphal, Kenneth R. & Longuenesse, Beatrice
Kant.Guyer, Paul

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