Kant: Epistemology

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  1. On the Necessity of the Categories.Anil Gomes, Andrew Stephenson & A. W. Moore - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...)
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  2. ‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity.Janum Sethi - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (9):20.
    Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according (...)
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  3. Definición de verdad y criterios de verdad en Kant.Stéfano Straulino - 2020 - Con-Textos Kantianos 11:132-159.
    On the few occasions that Kant addresses the subject of truth, he usually does so in relation to the problems involved in the nominal definition of truth and in the search for a truth criterion. The aim of this paper is to provide a synoptic view of the way in which Kant poses these two issues. In the first section of the paper I address the topic of the definition of truth. I begin by explaining what a definition is and (...)
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  4. Intersectionality as a Regulative Ideal.Katherine Gasdaglis & Alex Madva - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Appeals to intersectionality serve to remind us that social categories like race and gender cannot be adequately understood independently from each other. But what, exactly, is the intersectional thesis a thesis about? Answers to this question are remarkably diverse. Intersectionality is variously understood as a claim about the nature of social kinds, oppression, or experience ; about the limits of antidiscrimination law or identity politics ; or about the importance of fuzzy sets, multifactor analysis, or causal modeling in social science.
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  5. The Oxford Handbook of Kant.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
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  6. Kant on de Se.Luca Forgione - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlino, Germania: De Gruyter. pp. 3779-3786.
    Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.
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  7. Критика Кантом учения Декарта о cogito.Arsenii Khitrov - 2005 - In Форум молодых кантоведов (По материалам Международного конгресса, посвященного 280-летию со дня рождения и 200-летию со дня смерти Иммануила Канта). pp. 44–51.
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  8. In Defence of Transcendental Idealism: Reply to McWherter.Guus Duindam - 2018 - Journal of Critical Realism 17 (5):514-518.
    I recently argued that critical realists ought to adopt transcendental idealism in favour of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. In response, Dustin McWherter presents two arguments against transcendental idealism: it is inferior to transcendental realism because it cannot account for the epistemic significance of experimentation, and it is internally inconsistent because it affirms the existence of things-in-themselves. This brief reply defends transcendental idealism against both objections.
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  9. Reinholds linguistischer Schematismus.Sven Bernecker - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Nature and Freedom: Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress. Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter. pp. 3369-3377.
    In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich eine neue Interpretation der Reinhold’schen Sprachphilosophie vor. Mein Ziel ist es zu erklären, wie Reinhold der Meinung sein konnte, seine Sprachphilosophie stelle, ebenso wie seine Elementarphilosophie, den Versuch dar, Kants Kritische Philosophie zu fundieren. Außerdem möchte ich zeigen, worin die philosophische Bedeutung von Reinholds Ansatz gegenüber den Sprachphilosophien seiner Zeitgenossen besteht.
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  10. Kant and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Luca Forgione - 2018 - New York, Stati Uniti: Routledge.
    This book addresses the problem of self-knowledge in Kant’s philosophy. As Kant writes in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the simple and empty representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension. This book articulates Kant’s theory of self-knowledge on the basis of the following three philosophical problems: 1) a semantic problem regarding the type of reference of the representation ‘I’; 2) an epistemic problem regarding (...)
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  11. Husserl’s Covert Critique of Kant in the Sixth Book of Logical Investigations.Corijn van Mazijk - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (1):15-33.
    In the final book of Logical Investigations from 1901, Husserl develops a theory of knowledge based on the intentional structure of consciousness. While there is some textual evidence that Husserl considered this to entail a critique of Kantian philosophy, he did not elaborate substantially on this. This paper reconstructs the covert critique of Kant’s theory of knowledge which LI contains. With respect to Kant, I discuss three core aspects of his theory of knowledge which, as Husserl’s reflections on Kant indicate, (...)
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  12. Kant’s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Gerd Buchdahl’s and Michael Friedman’s Accounts.Saniye Vatansever - 2018 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 8 (2):310–346.
    This article presents a critical analysis of two influential readings of Kant’s Second Analogy, namely, Gerd Buchdahl’s “modest reading” and Michael Friedman’s “strong reading.” After pointing out the textual and philosophical problems with each, I advance an alternative reading of the Second Analogy argument. On my reading, the Second Analogy argument proves the existence of necessary and strictly universal causal laws. This, however, does not guarantee that Kant has a solution for the problem of induction. After I explain why the (...)
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  13. How to Solve the Knowability Paradox with Transcendental Epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
    A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view by providing for a (...)
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  14. Sublating Kant and the Old Metaphysics: A Reading of the Transition From Being to Essence in Hegel's Logic.Michael Baur - 1998 - The Owl of Minerva 29 (2):139-164.
    Kant’s “transcendental” or “critical” philosophy is an instance of what can be called the “critique of immediacy.” As part of his critical project, Kant argues that one cannot merely assume that there is a reestablished harmony between thought and being. Instead, one must effect a “return to the subject” and examine the forms of thought themselves, in order to determine the extent to which thought and being are commensurable. As a result of his “transcendental turn,” Kant concludes that what at (...)
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  15. Regulative Principles and Regulative Ideas.Gary Banham - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 15-24.
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  16. Kant - Analysen, Probleme, Kritik (English Translation of 1988 Article).Susanne Bobzien - unknown
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  17. Formal A Priori, or Material A Priori: On Scheler's Critique of Kant's Concept of the A Priori.Zhang Renzhi - 2008 - Modern Philosophy 1:016.
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  18. "Limite" e "analogia" in alcuni aspetti della filosofia crítica di kant.Antonio Moretto - 1986 - Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 15 (4):341-364.
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  19. Sueños de un racionalista. Sobre la diatriba de Kant contra Swedenborg o por una ontología simbólica.Máximo Lameiro - 2008 - A Parte Rei 58:4.
    On 18th century Kant found the Swedenborg's writings, and then wrote an aggressive refutation titled "The dream of a visionary". But Kant did not understand the Swedenborg experience and theories really. Because his rationalism he was unable to do that. This paper analyse the Kant's argumentation and shows its weak points and his inadequacy.
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  20. Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality.Sacha Golob - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
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  21. Kant, Lonergan, and Fichte on the Critique of Immediacy and the Epistemology of Constraint in Human Knowing.Michael Baur - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91-112.
    One of the defining characteristics of Kant’s “critical philosophy” is what has been called the “critique of immediacy” or the rejection of the “myth of the given.” According to the Kantian position, no object can count as an object for a human knower apart from the knower’s own activity or spontaneity. That is, no object can count as an object for a human knower on the basis of the object’s givenness alone. But this gives rise to a problem: how is (...)
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  22. Problems From Kant by James Van Cleve. [REVIEW]Michael Baur - 2003 - International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):124-126.
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  23. Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. [REVIEW]José A. Benardete - 1992 - International Studies in Philosophy 24 (3):117-118.
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Kant: Assent
  1. Kant and the Demands of Reflection. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - SGIR Review 2 (1):42-59.
    From an author meets critics session on Melissa Merritt's *Kant on Reflection and Virtue*.
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  2. Kantian Non-Evidentialism and its German Antecedents: Crusius, Meier, and Basedow.Brian A. Chance - 2019 - Kantian Review 3 (24):359-384.
    This article aims to highlight the extent to which Kant’s account of belief draws on the views of his contemporaries. Situating the non-evidentialist features of Crusius’s account of belief within his broader account, I argue that they include antecedents to both Kant’s distinction between pragmatic and moral belief and his conception of a postulate of pure practical reason. While moving us closer to Kant’s arguments for the first postulate, however, both Crusius’s and Meier’s arguments for the immortality of the soul (...)
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  3. Kant’s Theoretical Reasons for Belief in Things in Themselves.Mark Pickering - 2016 - Kant-Studien 107 (4):589-616.
    I argue that Kant’s commitment to the existence of things in themselves takes the form of a commitment short of knowledge that does not violate the limitations on knowledge which he lays down. I will argue that Kant’s commitment fits his description of what he calls “doctrinal belief”: acceptance of the existence of things in themselves which is subjectively sufficient but not objectively sufficient. I outline two ways in which we accept the existence of things in themselves which are subjectively (...)
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  4. Knowledge, Discipline, System, Hope: The Fate of Metaphysics in the Doctrine of Method.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In James O'Shea (ed.), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Guide. New York, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 259-279.
    In this chapter I highlight the apparent tensions between Kant’s very stringent critique of metaphysical speculation in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” chapter and his endorsement of Belief (Glaube) and hope (Hoffnung) regarding metaphysical theses in the subsequent “Canon of Pure Reason.” In the process I will examine his distinction between the theoretical and the practical bases for holding a “theoretical” conclusion (i.e. a conclusion about “what exists” rather than “what ought to be”) and argue that the position is subtle (...)
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  5. Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge.Thomas Höwing - 2016 - In The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 201-222.
    The paper addresses an exegetical puzzle that is raised by Kant's distinction between opining (Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). In presenting his moral arguments, Kant often points out that belief, as he conceives of it, has a unique feature: it requires non-epistemic justification. Yet Kant's official formulation of the tripartite distinction runs counter to this claim. It describes Belief in terms of a set of two features, each of which also pertains to either opinion or knowledge. My aim in (...)
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  6. Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant.John Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 1996 - Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258.
    The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and (...)
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  7. Real Repugnance and Belief About Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant's Three Solutions.Andrew Chignell - 2010 - In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter DeGruyter.
    Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, speculative fancies (...)
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  8. Real Repugnance and Our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel.Andrew Chignell - 2011 - Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 7:135-159.
    Kant holds that in order to have knowledge of an object, a subject must be able to “prove” that the object is really possible—i.e., prove that there is neither logical inconsistency nor “real repugnance” between its properties. This is (usually) easy to do with respect to empirical objects, but (usually) impossible to do with respect to particular things-in-themselves. In the first section of the paper I argue that an important predecessor of Kant’s account of our ignorance of real possibility can (...)
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  9. Belief in Kant.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.
    Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...)
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  10. Kant's Concepts of Justification.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...)
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Kant: Justification
  1. Kant, the Practical Postulates, and Clifford’s Principle.Samuel Kahn - 2020 - Contemporary Pragmatism 17 (1):21-47.
    In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have (...)
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  2. 3. The Quid Juris.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - In Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. De Gruyter. pp. 28-62.
    What is the Quid Juris in Kant's Deduction? Chapter 3 from my book on the Deduction (Kant's Deduction From Apperception) provides an answer to that question, and also contains an extensive discussion of the relevant literature on this topic (Henrich, Proops, Seeberg & Longuenesse).
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  3. Problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. 195-255.
    In this paper, I discuss the debate on Kant and nonconceptual content. Inspired by Kant’s account of the intimate relation between intuition and concepts, McDowell (1996) has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Kantians Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view the charge that it neglects the (...)
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  4. Kant on Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge.Thomas Höwing - 2016 - In The Highest Good in Kant’s Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 201-222.
    The paper addresses an exegetical puzzle that is raised by Kant's distinction between opining (Meinen), believing (Glauben), and knowing (Wissen). In presenting his moral arguments, Kant often points out that belief, as he conceives of it, has a unique feature: it requires non-epistemic justification. Yet Kant's official formulation of the tripartite distinction runs counter to this claim. It describes Belief in terms of a set of two features, each of which also pertains to either opinion or knowledge. My aim in (...)
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  5. Probleme des ‚Kantianischen‘ Nonkonzeptualismus Im Hinblick Auf Die B-Deduktion.Dennis Schulting - 2015 - Kant-Studien 106 (4):561-580.
    :Recently, Allais, Hanna and others have argued that Kant is a nonconceptualist about intuition and that intuitions refer objectively, independently of the functions of the understanding. Kantian conceptualists have responded, which the nonconceptualists also cite as textual evidence for their reading) that this view conflicts with the central goal of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: to argue that all intuitions are subject to the categories. I argue that the conceptualist reading of KrV, A 89 ff./B 122 ff. is unfounded. Further, I argue (...)
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  6. Is Kant (W)Right? – On Kant’s Regulative Ideas and Wright’s Entitlements.Jochen Briesen - 2013 - Kant-Yearbook 5 (1):1-32.
    This paper discusses a structural analogy between Kant’s theory of regulative ideas, as he develops it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, and Crispin Wright’s theory of epistemic entitlements. First, I argue that certain exegetical difficulties with respect to the Appendix rest on serious systematic problems, which – given other assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason – Kant is unable to solve. Second, I argue that because of the identified structural analogy between Kant’s and Wright’s views the project (...)
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  7. Kant on Experiment.Alberto Vanzo - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor. Springer. pp. 75-96.
    This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...)
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  8. ‘Constructivism, Contractarianism and Basic Obligations: Kant and Gauthier’.Kenneth R. Westphal - forthcoming - In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right.
    Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each agent has (...)
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  9. Kant's Justification of the Death Penalty Reconsidered.Benjamin S. Yost - 2010 - Kantian Review 15 (2):1-27.
    This paper argues that Immanuel Kant’s practical philosophy contains a coherent, albeit implicit, defense of the legitimacy of capital punishment, one that refutes the most important objections leveled against it. I first show that Kant is consistent in his application of the ius talionis. I then explain how Kant can respond to the claim that death penalty violates the inviolable right to life. To address the most significant objection – the claim that execution violates human dignity – I argue that (...)
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  10. Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  11. Kant's Concepts of Justification.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...)
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  12. Faith as Kant's Key to the Justification of Transcendental Reflection.Stephen Palmquist - 1984 - Heythrop Journal 25 (4):442–455.
    A revised version of this article became Chapter V in my 1993 book, Kant's System of Perspectives.
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Kant: Cognition and Knowledge
  1. Does Post-Newtonian Physics Suggest a Post-Kantian View of Human Experience?Paavo Pylkkänen - 2020 - Pari Perspectives 6 (December 2020):122-128.
    Immanuel Kant famously thought that the presuppositions of Newtonian physics are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in general – both “outer” and “inner” experience. Today we know, of course, that Newtonian physics only applies to a limited domain of physical reality and is radically inadequate in the quantum and relativistic domains. This gives rise to an interesting question: could the radical changes in physics suggest new conditions for the possibility of experience? In other words, does post-Newtonian physics (...)
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  2. Kant’s Better-Than-Terrible Argument in the Anticipations of Perception.David Landy - 2020 - Kantian Review 25 (1):77-101.
    Scholars working on Kant’s Anticipations of Perception generally attribute to him an argument that invalidly infers that objects have degrees of intensive magnitude from the premise that sensations do. I argue that this rests on an incorrect disambiguation of Kant’s use of Empfindung as referring to the mental states that are our sensings, rather than the objects that are thereby sensed. Kant’s real argument runs as follows. The difference between a representation of an empty region of space and/or time and (...)
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  3. Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of Hermann Cohen’s Antipsychologism.Scott Edgar - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):254-273.
    Some commentators on Hermann Cohen have remarked on what they take to be a puzzle about the origins of his mature anti-psychologism. When Cohen was young, he studied a kind of psychology, the Völkerpsychologie of Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal, and wrote apparently psycholgistic accounts of knowledge almost up until the moment he first articulated his anti-psychologistic neo-Kantianism. To be sure, Cohen's mature anti psycholgism does constitute a rejection of certain central commitments of Völkerpsychologie. However, the relation between Völkerpsychologie and (...)
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  4. Transcendental Idealism and the Transcendental Deduction.Lucy Allais - 2011 - In Dennis Schulting & Jacco Verburgt (eds.), Kant's Idealism. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 91-107.
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  5. The Transcendental Object, Experience, and the Thing in Itself.Michael Oberst - manuscript
    Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things (...)
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