Do We See Facts?

Mind and Language (4):674-693 (2020)
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Abstract

Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology and epistemology of visual perception.

Author's Profile

Alfredo Vernazzani
Ruhr-Universit├Ąt Bochum

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