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  1. added 2018-02-17
    The Physical World as a Blob: Is OSR Really Realism?Mauro Dorato - 2016 - Metascience 25 (2):173-181.
    In my review of Steven French's The structure of the world. Metaphysics & Representation. OUP, Oxford, 2014 I argue that the author is forced to navigate between the Scilla of Tegmark’s Pitagoreanism (2008) and the Carybdis of “blobobjectivism” (Horgan and Potrč 2008), namely the claim that the whole physical universe is a single concrete structurally complex but partless cosmos (a “blob”).
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  2. added 2018-02-17
    Die aristotelische Substanz als Wendepunkt in der Ontologie der Antike.Gianluigi Segalerba - 2010 - Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte (Sonderheft 8):161-172.
    This study shows that Aristotle’s introduction of the concept of substance represents a caesura in the history of ontology. The study takes two values for substance into consideration, which are a) substance as an organism (as a biological entity) and b) substance as essence, nature, form of an organism. Substances as organisms are biological concretized properties. Substance as form is the soul directing the organism and the development of the organism; the soul is both the principle of life of the (...)
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  3. added 2018-02-17
    Aspekte der Substanz bei Aristoteles.Gianluigi Segalerba - 2008 - In Gianluigi Segalerba, Antonella Lang-Balestra & Holger Gutschmidt (eds.), Substantia - Sic et Non. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Ontos. pp. 35-84.
    The study deals with the main aspects of substance in the works of Aristotle. The presence of a plurality of values for substance is the central idea of the study; in particular, substance has 1) the value of living biological entity and 2) the value of form of the biological entity; both values are fundamental components of Aristotle's theory of substance. The prevalence, in the works of Aristotle, of the first or of the second of the two values depends on (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-16
    The Ambiguity of Indiscernibility.John Dilworth - manuscript
    I argue that there is an ambiguity in the concept of indiscernibility as applied to objects, because there are two different categories of properties, associated with two different ways in which all of the pre-theoretical 'properties' of an object may be identified. In one structural way, identifications of properties are independent of any particular spatial orientation of the object in question, but in another 'field' way, identifications are instead dependent on an object's particular spatial orientation, so that its properties as (...)
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  5. added 2017-11-03
    Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism.David Glick - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy008.
    Ontic structural realism (OSR) claims that all there is to the world is structure. But how can this slogan be turned into a worked-out metaphysics? Here I consider one potential answer: a metaphysical framework known as generalism (Dasgupta, 2009, 2016). According to the generalist, the most fundamental description of the world is not given in terms of individuals bearing properties, but rather, general facts about which states of affairs obtain. However, I contend that despite several apparent similarities between the positions, (...)
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  6. added 2017-09-03
    Eithics and Ontology: Present Rights of Future Individuals and Property Instantiation.Aleksandar Jokic - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Research 24:473-486.
    In this century technology, production, and their consequent environmental impact have advanced to the point where unrectifiable and uncontroIlable global imbalances may emerge. Hence, decisions made by existing human beings are capable of dramaticaIly affecting the welfare of future generations. Current controversy about environmental protection involves the question of whether our present obligations to future generations can be grounded in their present rights. Many philosophers would question the very intelligibility of the idea that future individuals might have present rights. They (...)
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  7. added 2017-04-21
    Qualitative Grounds.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):309-348.
    Suppose that all non-qualitative facts are grounded in qualitative facts. I argue that this view naturally comes with a picture in which trans-world identity is indeterminate. But this in turn leads to either pervasive indeterminacy in the non-qualitative, or else contingency in what facts about modality and possible worlds are determinate.
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  8. added 2016-12-08
    Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of Primitives in Ontological Theories.Jiri Benovsky - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):101-121.
    Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate (...)
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  9. added 2016-03-01
    Thing and Object.Kristie Miller - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):69-89.
    There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.
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  10. added 2015-05-31
    Metaphysical Foundations of Neoclassical Mechanics.Marius Stan - 2017 - In Michela Massimi & Angela Breitenbach (eds.), Kant and the Laws of Nature. Cambridge University Press. pp. 214-234.
    I examine here if Kant’s metaphysics of matter can support any late-modern versions of classical mechanics. I argue that in principle it can, by two different routes. I assess the interpretive costs of each approach, and recommend the most promising strategy: a mass-point approach.
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  11. added 2014-06-03
    What Constitutes a Formal Analogy?Kenneth Olson & Gilbert Plumer - 2002 - In Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson & Robert C. Pinto (eds.), Argumentation and its Applications [CD-ROM]. Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation. pp. 1-8.
    There is ample justification for having analogical material in standardized tests for graduate school admission, perhaps especially for law school. We think that formal-analogy questions should compare different scenarios whose structure is the same in terms of the number of objects and the formal properties of their relations. The paper deals with this narrower question of how legitimately to have formal analogy test items, and the broader question of what constitutes a formal analogy in general.
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  12. added 2014-03-25
    The Nature of Substance.Ian J. Thompson - 1988 - Cogito 2 (2):17-19.
    Modern physics has cast doubt on Newton's idea of particles with definite properties. Do we have to go back to Aristotle for a new understanding of the ultimate nature of substance? If we ask, `what is the nature of substance?', we might be told that this substance is salt, that one is copper, or that the atomic nucleus is a mixture of protons and neutrons. But what are all these substances? What do they have in common which makes them substances? (...)
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  13. added 2014-03-18
    Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):143-164.
    Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz''s reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also `implicitly (...)
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  14. added 2014-03-04
    The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506.
    Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As (...)
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  15. added 2014-03-04
    Bundles, Individuation and Indiscernibility.Matteo Morganti - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):36-48.
    In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes an allegedly new way of conceiving of individuation in the context of the bundle theory of object constitution. He suggests that allowing for distance relations to individuate objects solves the problems with worlds containing indiscernible objects that would otherwise affect the theory. The aim of the present paper is i) To show that Demirli’s proposal falls short of achieving this goal and ii) To carry out a more general critical assessment of the (...)
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  16. added 2014-02-10
    What Are Physical Objects?Ned Markosian - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):375-395.
    The concept of a physical object has figured prominently in the history of philosophy, and is probably more important now than it has ever been before. Yet the question What are physical objects?, i.e., What is the correct analysis of the concept of a physical object?, has received surprisingly little attention. The purpose of this paper is to address this question. I consider several attempts at answering the question, and give my reasons for preferring one of them over its rivals. (...)
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  17. added 2013-12-09
    Locke on Substance in General.Gabor Forrai - 2010 - Locke Studies 10:27-59.
    Locke’s conception of substance in general or substratum has two relatively widespread interpretations. According to one, substance in general is the bearer of properties, a pure subject, something which sustains properties but itself has no properties. I will call this interpretation traditional, because it has already been formulated by Leibniz. According to the other interpretation, substance is general is something like real essence: an underlying structure which is responsible for the fact that certain observable properties form stable, recurrent clusters. I (...)
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  18. added 2013-06-18
    Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism About Objects.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2013 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 6 (1):1-14.
    Ted Sider argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is flawed. I shall describe one kind of nihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of the things we usually encounter do not exist. That is, I take talk of macroscopic objects and macroscopic properties to refer to sets of fundamental properties, which are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. This view is a (...)
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  19. added 2013-05-13
    Kant's Appearances and Things in Themselves as Qua‐Objects.Colin Marshall - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):520-545.
    The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in (...)
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  20. added 2012-12-27
    Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW]Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
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  21. added 2012-07-03
    What Fundamental Properties Suffice to Account for the Manifest World? Powerful Structure.Sharon R. Ford - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Queensland
    This Thesis engages with contemporary philosophical controversies about the nature of dispositional properties or powers and the relationship they have to their non-dispositional counterparts. The focus concerns fundamentality. In particular, I seek to answer the question, ‘What fundamental properties suffice to account for the manifest world?’ The answer I defend is that fundamental categorical properties need not be invoked in order to derive a viable explanation for the manifest world. My stance is a field-theoretic view which describes the world as (...)
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  22. added 2012-03-16
    Tropes, Intensional Relative Clauses, and the Notion of a Variable Object.Friederike Moltmann - 2012 - In Aloni Maria, Kimmelman Vadim, Weidman Sassoon Galit, Roloefson Floris, Schulz Katrin & Westera Matthjis (eds.), Proceedings of the 18th Amsterdam Colloquium 2011. Springer.
    NPs with intensional relative clauses such as 'the impact of the book John needs to write' pose a significant challenge for trope theory (the theory of particularized properties), since they seem to refer to tropes that lack an actual bearer. This paper proposes a novel semantic analysis of such NPs on the basis of the notion of a variable object. The analysis avoids a range of difficulties that an alternative analysis based on the notion of an individual concept would face.
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  23. added 2011-12-10
    Quasi-Supplementation, Plenitudinous Coincidentalism, and Gunk.Cody Gilmore - forthcoming - In Robert Garcia (ed.), Substance: New Essays. Philosophia Verlag.
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  24. added 2011-07-21
    On (Not) Being in Two Places at the Same Time: An Argument Against Endurantism.Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
    Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. (...)
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  25. added 2011-07-21
    Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2002 - Clarendon Press.
    Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra offers a fresh philosophical account of properties. How is it that two different things (such as two red roses) can share the same property (redness)? According to resemblance nominalism, things have their properties in virtue of resembling other things. This unfashionable view is championed with clarity and rigor.
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  26. added 2011-07-21
    Universals and Properties.George Bealer - 1998 - In S. Laurence C. MacDonald (ed.), Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 131.
    This paper summarizes and extends the transmodal argument for the existence of universals (developed in full detail in "Universals"). This argument establishes not only the existence of universals, but also that they exist necessarily, thereby confirming the ante rem view against the post rem and in re views (and also anti-existentialism against existentialism). Once summarized, the argument is extended to refute the trope theory of properties and is also shown to succeed even if possibilism is assumed. A nonreductionist theory of (...)
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