Fichte’s Normative Ethics: Deontological or Teleological?

Mind 127 (506):565-584 (2018)
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Abstract
One of the most controversial issues to emerge in recent studies of Fichte concerns the status of his normative ethics, i.e., his theory of what makes actions morally good or bad. Scholars are divided over Fichte’s view regarding the ‘final end’ of moral striving, since it appears this end can be either a specific goal permitting maximizing calculations (the consequentialist reading defended by Kosch 2015), or an indeterminate goal permitting only duty-based decisions (the deontological reading defended by Wood 2016). While I think each interpretive position contains an element of truth, my aim in this paper is to defend a third alternative, according to which Fichte’s normative ethics presents us with a unique form of social perfectionism.
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First archival date: 2017-08-22
Latest version: 3 (2018-09-21)
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Perfectionism.Hurka, Thomas

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